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FOREWORD 
This third volume of the Young Researchers’ Contribution Series comprises articles by PhD 
scholars who are participating in the international educational project, “Cooperation in 
Training of Young Researchers in the Field of Governance in the Public Sector (EduGov)” 
(2015-2016), funded by the UTFORSK Partnership Programme, which is administered by the 
Norwegian Centre for International Cooperation in Education (SIU, Norway). This programme 
supports project cooperation between higher education institutions in Norway and their 
counterparts in Brazil, China, India, Japan, Russia and South Africa. UTFORSK also aims to 
enhance the quality of international cooperation in education by encouraging links to 
research cooperation and work life. To address this call, the EduGov project connects the 
Research Council of Norway’s project, “Local Government Budgeting Reforms in Russia 
(BUDRUS)”, and existing research cooperation between Norway and Russia by developing 
research competencies at Master- and PhD level. EduGov links BUDRUS’s ongoing research ‒ 
on the impact of changes in the budgeting practices in different dimensions of governance  ‒ 
to education activities at Master- and PhD levels and extends it by reflecting upon 
multidisciplinary and multitheoretical research approaches to governance and their 
implications for the private and public sectors in the High North context.  
As part of the EduGov project, and to contribute to research-based education, the PhD course 
“Governance in the High North: Implications for Arctic Private and Public Sector” was 
organized in 2016 in two parts: the first in Bodø, Norway and the second in St. Petersburg, 
Russia. The PhD course concentrated on the multidisciplinary approach to governance and 
how to reflect upon it in the different contexts, focusing on the particular ‘level’ of governance 
associated with a type of organization (including, for example, public governance, global 
governance, and corporate governance). The course was open to international scholars from 
various fields (business studies, economics, public administration, political science, etc.), 
wishing to carry out research on topics associated with governance in the public and private 
sectors in the context of the High North and in general. PhD students also took part in the 
scenario workshop, where they led multidisciplinary groups of Master’s students in producing 
a scenario on a specific topic developed by relevant stakeholders in the High North. 
The essays focus on the perspectives and challenges in respect of the issues of governance in 
the public and private sectors in the context of the High North and in general. In addition, PhD 
students were asked to reflect on and discuss learning points from participating in the PhD 
course in relation to their ongoing research project.  
Bardora Padrtova considers the topic of securitization: in particular, the regional security 
patterns in the Arctic region. Gregor Sharp illustrates the usefulness of the interdisciplinary, 
young and varied approach in studying complexities surrounding the Arctic. An interesting 
discussion about the interface between scientific research and policy formulation in the Arctic 
is provided by Hema Nadarajah. Meanwhile, Irina Zhilina discusses the regime formation 
processes in the Arctic by using the example of Norwegian-Russian cooperation in the area of 
offshore hydrocarbon development. Jon Skinner’s focus is on the scenario method as an 
approach to studying complex systems, i.e. identifying key drivers or variables that impact 
hydrocarbon development by interacting in a complex framework at varying speeds and in a 
non-linear manner. Julia Olsen’s paper deals with the socio-economic heterogeneity of the 
Arctic region for the local governance system by using three primary variables: multiple 
stressors in the Arctic, increasing shipping activities and local communities. Mark Stoller 
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examines the role of Canada in the context of the future Arctic by focusing on some aspects 
of the Canadian experience of trying to exploit Arctic resources; Stoller then incorporates 
these into discussions of futures forecasting, value creation and governance for the High 
North. In his essay, Neil Oculi connects issues of the Arctic and Small Island Development 
States (SIDS) by demonstrating how sea-level rise and melting ice in the Arctic region affect 
SIDS. Valeria Guerrieri argues that anticipatory strategies, for example scenario-planning in 
the case of the development of energy infrastructure such as pipelines, have the ability to 
exercise a rather ambiguous form of power through the means of hope. Finally, Zhaklin 
Yaneva discusses the role of the Arctic Council in the governance of the region and its role as 
a mediator between the different interests.  
We hope that the diversity of the papers presented in this volume will provide readers with 
interesting descriptions and illustrations of a variety of research topics connected to issues of 
governance and their implications for the private and public sectors in the context of the High 
North and in general. We also see that the PhD students’ reflection on learning points gave 
them a relevant insight into research-based education. Moreover, we believe that this volume 
in itself is a useful instrument for scholars to communicate their research projects and to 
reach out to authorities, enterprises, other scholars and students.  
 
 
Anatoli Bourmistrov      Elena Dybtsyna           Nadezda Nazarova  
Professor, PhD     Associate professor, PhD          Postdoctoral researcher, PhD 
 
Bodø  
February 15, 2017
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REGIONAL SECURITY PATTERNS IN THE ARCTIC 
Barbora Padrtová 
 
Introduction 
In recent years, the Arctic region has been attracting serious attention from scholars. The opening 
of the Arctic Ocean brings new opportunities and challenges, many of which are depicted and 
presented as a security threat for Arctic society. The regional security in the Arctic is built around 
interdependence mainly on political, military, economic and environmental issues. The region 
exhibits clearly defined and interconnected relations of cooperation and confrontation with an 
evidence of strategic potential shared with all of the regional actors. The Arctic can be defined as 
an independent geopolitical region with specific conditions and shared history. The Arctic is a 
significant security region with the longest direct border between NATO and Russia. Thus, its 
geopolitical importance is fundamental for all Arctic states and is likely to increase in the future. 
Although the level of military tension in the region is higher at the time of writing, it is still much 
lower than it used to be, and lower still than in other parts of the world. 
The author’s PhD thesis deals with the topic of securitization in the Arctic region. In this paper 
the author will focus on the regional security patterns in the Arctic. Security is considered to be 
one of the most important elements in the governance of every region. During the High North 
Dialogue (HND) 2016 conference, the author discovered several ideas, which will be useful for 
further research. Cooperation in the Arctic is one of the key factors for maintaining stability and 
peaceful relations among actors in the region. As both a conference and courses for Master’s and 
PhD students, HND 2016 showed that there are strong cooperative relations on different levels 
among countries from the Arctic region and beyond. To be able to achieve a level of trust and a 
high degree of cooperation among countries, it is important to start from the youth and student 
exchange programmes. Moreover, during the HND 2016 courses, Master’s students had a great 
opportunity, not only to learn how different predictions in the Arctic are created (during the 
lectures and presentations) but also to elaborate their own scenarios based on the given criteria 
(course activity). PhD students then assisted Master’s students and served as a ’bridge’ when 
connecting top experts in the field with young innovative ’brains’.  
Furthermore, the conference itself showed a high level of interconnectedness of several areas 
and themes. The scenario-building activity included, among other things, predictions of future 
security developments in the Arctic and mapped implications of those scenarios for a particular 
sector of the High North economy. All the opportunities for the Arctic economy are strongly 
influenced by the governance and the regimes in specific states. Thus, the political elite in the 
Arctic states are trying to look at the security and stability through wider lenses, taking into 
account the interconnectedness of different factors. 
Governance in the Arctic, the central topic of the HND 2016 courses, currently reflects 
international systemic changes. Moreover, it also mirrors how global changes and trends impact 
developments in the Arctic in different sectors, including the security sector. From this point of 
view, governance and security are inseparable and show a high level of interdependency.  
Following the introduction, the author looks at the importance of regional security and its role in 
the future of the Arctic. The paper describes how regional security is created and what the criteria 
are for the classification of the Arctic as an individual regional security complex. Later, the author 
briefly elaborates on the so-called ’Russian factor’ and on Russia as a key player in the 
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cooperative and peaceful development of the Arctic. Finally, the paper presents several thoughts 
on how the Arctic might look in the future, based on proposed scenarios. 
 
Regional security 
The Copenhagen School, headed by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, introduced a theoretical 
framework of regional security complexes (RSC) - the analytical scheme, which enables 
structuring the analysis of how security concerns tie together in a regional formation, where 
geographical adjacency is the factor of highest importance. Authors of the theory distinguish 
different RSCs around the world; however, they have not included the Arctic or polar territories 
as such. The Arctic is therefore considered as a sort of ’leftover’ region, without any significant 
security dynamics. The reason behind this could be either the low intensity of regional security 
interactions or the peripheral location of the Arctic. The latter characteristic, however, has been 
gradually changing.  
The essential idea of the regional security complex theory (RSCT) is based on the presumption 
that a comprehensive analysis of one isolated object (e.g. the security of Norway) must be 
studied in a wider context (Buzan et al., 1998). Buzan and Wæver argue that most states fear 
their neighbours more than distant powers, because most threats travel more easily over short 
distances than over long ones, and that security interdependence is, therefore, normally 
patterned into regionally-based clusters. The classical approach to regional security analysis looks 
for patterns of security interdependence that are strong enough to mark a group of units from 
its neighbours. The RSC is defined as “a set of units whose major processes of securitization, 
desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be 
analysed or resolved apart from one another.” Complexes are ultimately determined by the 
interaction among their units - interstate security relations - that lead to distinctive regional 
patterns, shaped by both the distribution of power and historical relations of amity and enmity. 
The RSC is constituted by the regional actors, as they are the ones defining the problem and 
interacting to produce a regional formation over the issue. The dynamics and structure of a 
security complex are generated by the states within that complex - by their security perceptions 
of, and interactions with, each other (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). 
Traditionally, RSCs were generated by bottom-up or inside-out processes, stemming from the 
fears and concerns within the region. However, the new definition intentionally opens the 
possibility of another kind of construction of RSCs, which is increasingly relevant especially in the 
’new’ sectors: regions can be created as patterns within system level processes (Buzan et al., 
1998). For example, a group of countries that find themselves sharing the local effects of a 
climate change is a case of collective response to shared fates arising from outside systemic 
pressure.  
The particular character of a local RSC is also often affected by historical factors. The formation 
of RSCs derives from the interplay between, on the one hand, the anarchic structure and its 
balance-of-power consequences and, on the other, the pressures of local geographical proximity. 
The security interdependence is markedly more intense between the states inside complexes 
than it is between those outside of it. Moreover, simple physical adjacency tends to generate 
more security interaction among neighbours than among states located in different areas. 
According to the Copenhagen School, in order to qualify as an RSC, a group of states or other 
entities must possess a degree of security interdependence sufficient to both establish them as 
a linked set and differentiate them from surrounding security regions (Buzan and Wæver, 2003).  
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Since the Arctic is a ’region of peripheries’, it also finds itself on the periphery of scholarly interest. 
Buzan and Wæver’s comprehensive analysis of patterns of regional security contains no mention 
of either the Circumpolar or the European Arctic region (neither of the two regions is defined by 
state borders). When we look at Buzan and Wæver’s maps (Mercator projections), we can see a 
distorted world because neither the northernmost nor the southernmost peripheral territories 
are shown. The geographical distortion could be caused by a failure to identify the precise 
northern boundaries for any Arctic-rimmed security complex and, also, it has been assumed by 
Buzan and Wæver that these territories are of little interest (Gibbs, 2011). 
To classify the Arctic as an RSC in accordance with the Copenhagen School’s revised framework, 
there is a need to specify two criteria/conditions. Firstly, the RSC has to display an 
interconnection of the major securitization and/or desecuritization processes. Secondly, the 
structure and security dynamics in the region should fit into the essential structure of the RSC. If 
the main (de)securitization processes exhibit strong linkages and the Arctic region in its structure 
reflects the essential structure of the RSC, then the Arctic can be classified as a distinct regional 
security complex.  
Securitization is defined as an inter-subjective process, by which a particular topic becomes an 
“existential threat that requires emergency measures and justifies actions deviating from the 
standard constraints of political processes.” The securitization act means the shifting of a specific 
topic from the non-politicized category through politicized to securitized (Buzan and Wæver, 
2003). Extraordinary measures, by which securitizing actors respond in practice to urgent threats, 
may for example include unprecedented militarization of specific areas, strengthening of the 
military presence in the region or demonstration of military capabilities. The opposite of 
securitization is a desecuritization process, when the securitized topic returns back to the political 
and public debate.  
The analysis of all securitization and desecuritization processes in different security sectors, as 
defined by Barry Buzan, would exceed the limits and purpose of this paper; nevertheless, it can 
be stated the main (de)/securitization processes in the Arctic exhibit sufficient consistency for 
emerging the RSC. Moreover, the research shows that sovereign Arctic states demonstrate 
strong dominance in the military-political sector, and the securitization ties outside this sector 
are generally very weak; although some scholars, including Exner-Pirot (2013), assess that, 
exceptionally in the Arctic, the environmental sector dominates the security dynamics and 
determines circumpolar relations.  
The essential structure of an RSC embodies four variables - boundary, anarchic structure, polarity 
and social construction.  
 (1) Boundary differentiates the RSC from its neighbours and determines the dynamics inside the 
RSC. Identifying the borders of the RSC is no different from identifying the borders of any other 
artificially created geographical entity. Inside the RSC, there are visible features of security 
interdependence (the intensity/relative strength of security interactions) among individual 
states/units, while security relations with others - outside the RSC - are weaker (Buzan et al., 
1998). In some regions, these features are more visible and stronger (for example between 
Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China), while, in other regions, they can be relatively weak 
(as between states within the European Union) (Gibbs, 2011).  
According to Buzan and Wæver (2003), the boundaries of the complex are identical to the 
external borders of the units (states). This can be a problematic element in the case of the Arctic 
as it does not consist of whole states but only parts - northern peripheral territories - of individual 
states. Thus, if the classic version of RSCT were to be strictly applied, the classification of the 
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Arctic as an RSC fails, because the original theory explicitly operates with states as the exclusive 
building elements of the RSC. The revised definition, however, has replaced the term ’state’ with 
a more general term, ’unit’, which represents a sub-state entity (e.g. a sub-state region as an 
administrative unit of the state). From this perspective, the Arctic as a geographically coherent 
set of units may be classified as a distinct RSC. The possible demarcation line for the Arctic RSC 
could be defined as surrounding all territories which lie closely around and north of the Arctic 
Circle.  
 (2) The second element of the RSC’s essential structure is anarchy, which, according to Buzan 
and Wæver (2003, p. 53), means that the “RSC must be composed of two or more autonomous 
units.” Based on the theory, the RSC is a small version of the international system, which exhibits 
the same characteristics - plurality of actors and the absence/recognition of a central superior 
authority. The fact that four out of five Arctic rim states are founding members of NATO is not an 
expression of lack of anarchy in the region but rather the existence of a mature form of 
international organization on a regional level. From this point of view, the Arctic region fulfils the 
condition of anarchic structure, as it is composed of more than five units, which are subdivided 
into sub-units within each country’s sovereign territory. Thus, according to the RSCT, only water 
and ice extend beyond the northern territories of coastal states, and the Arctic Ocean might be 
categorized as an unstructured region. 
 (3) Based on Barry Buzan’s assumption, polarity covers the distribution of power among the 
units. RSCT differentiates three types of complexes - unipolar/hegemonic, bipolar and multipolar. 
Unipolarity in this case originates from the superiority of one regional actor, not the intervention 
of a global power or superpower. Moreover, Buzan and Wæver (2003) argue that the presence 
of a global power in the specific RSC means stronger interregional ties (between individual RSCs 
and neighbouring RSCs). Despite the fact that the United States is the only global superpower in 
the world, it does not hold a superpower position in the Arctic (not interfering in the regional 
security dynamics), because its presence in the region is geographically conditioned and thus 
permanent. Therefore, a unipolar character is rejected for the Arctic RSC. Moreover, given that 
the majority of security relations in the Arctic region relate primarily to the area of the Arctic 
Ocean (demarcation of the continental shelf, disputes over undersea borders, exploration and 
exploitation of natural resources, usage of new shipping routes), the United States might, in some 
respects, even be considered a weaker player. The reason is that the US has not ratified the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) yet, which precludes it from formally 
raising any claim regarding the continental shelf, unlike other Arctic states. This limitation puts 
the US in a weaker bargaining position in the debate on the future of the Arctic.  
Although the Arctic RSC contains two nuclear powers (the United States and Russia), they are 
both playing the role of a regional power. Neither of them dominates the Arctic regional security 
relations to the extent that the character of the RSC could be described as bipolar. Thus, the 
Arctic RSC is best described as a multipolar complex, where none of the actors is much stronger 
than the others. 
 (4) The last variable includes patterns of amity and enmity among the units. Relations between 
the countries within the complex range from real rapprochement and expectations of protection 
or support on the one hand to openly hostile relations motivated by suspicion and fear on the 
other. There can be two distinct opposite extremes of relations - ranging from total chaos, where 
all are enemies of all, to mutual trust and a generally accepted commitment to solve any conflicts 
peacefully. In addition, between these two poles is a relatively wide space of indifference or 
neutrality (Buzan and Wæver, 2003).  
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The Arctic is generally considered a peaceful region with pragmatic/cooperative relations among 
actors. However, with the increasing geopolitical importance of the region, the number of 
interactions among actors is on the rise and thus the current status quo might be threatened. 
The character of mutual relations among the Arctic states is to some extent related to their 
individual foreign policy traditions and orientations. We can see mutual friendly relations 
(conditioned historically and culturally) in different areas among Arctic states as well as 
antagonisms and unresolved territorial disputes in the Arctic Ocean, where countries have been 
searching for solutions for decades.  
Olaf Osica accurately classifies three different attitudes among the Arctic states, which determine 
the security dynamics in the region. The first group, entitled ’Arctic warriors’, is composed of 
Russia and Canada, whose Arctic presence to a large extent determines the identity of their 
foreign policies. Nordic countries, with Norway at the forefront, belong to the second group, 
called ’anxious pragmatists’, for whom the Arctic determines social and economic development. 
Nordic states, unlike Russia or Canada, are favourably inclined towards the involvement of the 
EU and NATO as organizations which strengthen their positions vis-à-vis the Arctic. The United 
States is characterized as a ’late player’, whose Arctic policies have only recently emerged (Osica, 
2010). For the US, the Arctic region is only one of a myriad of challenges and, compared with 
other regions, like East Asia or the Middle East, the Arctic has a secondary importance (Padrtová, 
2011). Nevertheless, Arctic policy might be highlighted in the next two years, as the US chairs the 
Arctic Council (2015-2017). 
One successful example of cooperative relations is the existence of regional organizations with a 
membership of (almost) all Arctic states, depending on different formats. The first Arctic 
organization was established in 1993 - the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) - which aimed to 
strengthen cooperation in the field of soft-security among regional actors. However, in this 
platform the US and Canada were left behind. Thus, in 1996 all eight Arctic states signed the 
Ottawa Declaration as a founding document of the Arctic Council (AC). The AC, as a high level 
intergovernmental forum, provides a means for promoting cooperation on common Arctic 
issues. Although, the AC is intentionally omitting security and military issues, the cooperation on 
other issues, particularly sustainable development, environmental issues, health and scientific 
research, is highly developed.  
It is important to distinguish between cooperation at the local level and at top-governmental 
level. Whereas the former still exhibits the strong engagement of all Arctic states, the latter has 
been disrupted in response to the Russian aggressive foreign policy (including violations of 
international law) and especially after the annexation of Ukrainian Crimea in March 2014. Since 
then NATO has halted all kinds of official cooperation with the Kremlin. This strategic decision 
will definitely have a negative impact on Russia’s status in the Arctic. 
Nevertheless, territorial disputes in the Arctic Ocean (more precisely, maritime limitations) are 
the most pronounced tensions in the region-between Russia and the US in the Bering Sea, and 
between Canada and the US in the Beaufort Sea. However, these disputes have been discussed 
within the limits of diplomatic means. Another conflict issue is the expansive territorial claims of 
one or several states from the region over the sovereignty of the Lomonosov Ridge - an 
underwater mountain range 1,800 kilometres long - which divides the Arctic. The Arctic states 
are trying to prove that the Lomonosov Ridge is the extension of their continental shelves, in 
order to gain exclusive rights to the territories, which lie beyond the Exclusive Economic zone 
(EEZ).   
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The last challenge, which all Arctic states are facing, is the rapid increase of interest in the region 
manifested by countries, which are geographically not directly linked to the Arctic, such as China, 
India, Japan or Singapore. The future security of the region is inseparably connected to the 
response of Arctic states to this challenge. 
 
The “Russian factor” 
Current relations between Russia and NATO are at the lowest level since the end of the Cold War. 
The ongoing armed conflict in Ukraine undermined the perception of Russia as a reliable partner 
in the eyes of Western countries. Although there are different perceptions of the Kremlin’s 
foreign policy among particular Alliance members, there is a general consensus on the 
condemnation of Russian military activities in Ukraine. As a consequence of current security 
changes in Europe, it has been a great challenge to maintain the Arctic region as a zone of peace 
and cooperation.   
Since 2013, Russia has been substantially restoring its old soviet military airfields and ports in the 
north. This has been followed by numerous military exercises (increased in number and scale), 
the modernization of military equipment and the deployment of two brigades with special 
training for operations in the Arctic environment. The first brigade was deployed in Alakurtti at 
the beginning of 2015 to the naval airbase with a strategic location, approximately 60 km from 
the Finnish border. The second brigade should be deployed behind the Ural Mountains in Yamal-
Nenets Autonomous Area by the end of 2016. Furthermore, Russia’s controversial statements, 
non-transparent sources of capabilities and military plans could lead to a classic security dilemma 
and increase the securitization of the whole region (Padrtová, 2014). As members of NATO, the 
US, Canada, Norway and Denmark have a stronger joint position in the region; thus, Russia’s 
topmost priority should be avoiding any further escalation and potential confrontation with 
other states, as this would inevitably lead to its isolation, not only in the Arctic region.  
Combined with political assertiveness, the intensified presence of the Russian naval and air forces 
has drawn much international attention. In a strategic context, Russia’s Arctic military capabilities 
and their modernization play a crucial role in their maintaining the current favourable status quo 
and deterring potential challengers. Following developments in Ukraine, it is expected that the 
Kremlin will continue to increase its military in the coming years. 
The very significant increase in the military deployment of Russian forces, together with frequent 
manoeuvres of bombers or fighter aircraft in the proximity or on the edge of Arctic states’ 
airspace, raises security concerns among other states in the region. Those developments 
inevitably lead to the improvement of US-Canadian capabilities - including NORAD air defense 
system (North American Aerospace Defense Command) based at the Greenland airport base in 
Thule, as well as capabilities of Norway and Denmark. This, in turn, leads to increasing Russian 
perceptions of insecurity and thus creates a classical security dilemma. Although the Kremlin 
emphasizes the cooperation and peaceful approach in finding solutions to Arctic disputes, official 
documents show quite the opposite. The new military doctrine from December 2014 declares 
that “One of the main objectives of Russia’s Armed Forces is to secure the national interests of 
the Russian Federation in the Arctic.” For the first time in history, Russia included its Arctic 
interests in its military doctrine. These elements highlight the strategic importance of the region 
for Russia (Padrtová, 2014).  
The first and most direct example of how the Ukraine conflict has started to impact Arctic 
cooperation was Canada’s decision to boycott an Arctic Council task force meeting held in 
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Moscow in April 2014.  This was followed by other similar meetings, where either Russia was not 
invited or Russian participation was boycotted by one or several Arctic states. Therefore, claims 
that there is no aggression in the north and that states are all cooperating fully on all levels is 
ignoring the reality.   
Furthermore, NATO and the EU members expressed their adverse stance towards Russian 
military actions in Ukraine when they collectively imposed sanctions on Moscow. These 
restrictive measures have had a dramatic impact on the Russian economy. 
Although it is unrealistic to isolate the Arctic from developments of the global security 
environment, it might serve as an exemplary laboratory for collaboration. The positive aspect of 
cooperation in the Arctic is that there is no need to open new channels of communication. 
Western countries can use the already established channels to maintain dialogue with Russia.  
One of the most functional platforms for cooperation is the Arctic Council (AC), which has been 
successful in several initiatives such as the oil spill response plan or the formation of the Arctic 
Economic Council in 2015.  
Another success of Arctic cooperation was the establishment of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum in 
late October 2015. In addition, all Arctic states should cooperate in regard to the determination 
of the limits of the outer continental shelf. Specific areas identified by Canada, Russia and 
Denmark overlap; thus, negotiations to resolve differences will be inevitable (Sevunts, 2016). 
Arctic relations to date have been mostly diplomatic and respectful of international law. On the 
one hand, all Arctic states should be able to prevent their disagreements on Ukraine and conflicts 
elsewhere from spreading north. On the other hand, the behaviour of the actors of the 
international security environment in one region cannot be separated from their behaviour in 
other regions. In contrast to Ukraine or Georgia, the Arctic is the only strategically important 
region where Russia has not thus far violated the internationally recognized borders and status 
quo. For the time being, Moscow respects international law in the Arctic, and all her claims for 
territorial expansion have been addressed by means of international law. The reason for this is 
that, for Moscow, the current status quo is most favourable, and it is not in Russian interest to 
have any kind of military conflict in the north. However, the question is whether the Kremlin will 
also respect the boundaries set by international law once the status quo no longer suits Russia.  
 
Instead of conclusion - future vision of the Arctic 
The key activity of the HND 2016 course was the attempt to predict the future and create a 
scenario with implications for different sectors in the Arctic. Although eight groups of students 
were working separately, most of them came up with very similar conclusions. In general, the 
future visions included several assumptions as factors which are happening in the present and 
will most probably continue happening in the future. Among those factors are the increasing role 
of non-Arctic states, the undisputable warming of the climate, improving infrastructure, increase 
in tourism, growing demand for energy, technological development and innovations and growing 
environmental protection. If uncertainties and so-called ’unpredictable black swans’ or wild cards 
are not taken into consideration (as they differ in each individual sector), the above-mentioned 
assumptions will be relevant in the future. Those factors will appear either in smaller or greater 
intensity but, in any case, will influence all sectors including Arctic shipping, the oil industry, 
fisheries, mining, the military sector and developments in the energy sector. 
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INTERDISCIPLINARY, YOUNG, AND VARIED: REFLECTIONS ON THE HIGH NORTH DIALOGUE  
Gregor Sharp 
 
Setting the stage for a discussion on the Arctic  
In 2007, just as the world was teetering on the brink of one of the worst economic recessions 
since the Great Depression, a small submersible, piloted by the Russian explorer, Artur 
Chilingarov, planted a titanium Russian flag on the seabed at the North Pole. Predictably, an 
international uproar ensued. The world was quick to condemn this action, with then Canadian 
Foreign Minister, Peter MacKay, dismissing the stunt by saying: “This isn’t the 15th century. You 
can't go around the world and just plant flags and say ‘We're claiming this territory’” (Parfitt, 
2007). Sensationalist headlines, such as “Move over Santa: Putin claims the North Pole”, soon 
followed (Garver, 2015). Fast forward several years and competing UNCLOS claims are submitted 
by Denmark, Canada, and Russia; the United States Geological Survey reveals vast potential 
mineral wealth in the region; and the annexation of Crimea leads to heightened tension between 
the West and Russia. The Arctic appears to be on the verge of conflict. 
In spite of the predictions carried by the media, the Arctic was not submerged in conflict. To the 
contrary, these last few years have seen impressive levels of cooperation between the Arctic 
powers above and beyond the already substantial regional cooperation that has characterized 
the last two decades. Early examples include the 1994 agreement between the US, Russia, China, 
Japan, South Korea, and Poland, as well as the 1999 agreement between Russia, Norway, and 
Iceland on managing fishery stocks in the Barents Sea (Byers, 2013). More recently in 2015, the 
five Arctic coastal states—Canada, Denmark, Russia, the US, and Norway—signed a declaration, 
in which they agreed to abstain from commercial fishing until a regulatory framework is 
developed, and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) brought into place the mandatory 
Polar Code for ships operating in the polar regions. Furthermore, the recently inaugurated 
headquarters of the Arctic Economic Council in Tromsø is a physical testament to the desire to 
foster cross-border business-to-business cooperation in the region.  
While this is by no means a comprehensive list, it is clear that, far from being on the verge of 
conflict, the Arctic is characterized by cooperation.  In bringing together a wide variety of 
speakers throughout the conference—spanning many different ages, backgrounds, and roles in 
the Arctic—the High North Dialogue is an important reminder of the many projects and problems 
that have been overshadowed by this focus on conflict. By moving past these lurid headlines, it 
becomes possible to focus on the multiplicity of pressing issues, ranging from climate change to 
local engagement, affecting the Circumpolar North.  
 
Asking the right questions 
Instead of endlessly speculating over the possibility of a ‘new Cold War’, there are many other 
questions worthy of our attention. In the case of my research, the governance of hydrocarbon 
extraction—the focus of much speculation and one of the alleged drivers of conflict in the 
Arctic—would not be possible without cooperation between states, companies, and 
organizations. This cooperation does not necessarily equate to clear or solid governance 
structures, however. Instead, as Oran Young points out, governance in the Arctic is not an easy 
question to tackle; it is a challenging region from many perspectives and the prospects of any 
form of strong legally binding charter or treaty are dim (Young, 2010). According to Stoker (1998), 
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this is especially true as the lines between private and public are blurred in creating governance 
outcomes.  
Coming into this conference with several overarching questions drawn from my focus on 
extractive industries, I was curious to see what would emerge. What can you do to ensure that 
best practices are being deployed? How do you design a project that meets the needs of current 
and future generations? Is it possible or even desirable to create meaningful Arctic specific 
regulations? In response to these questions, amongst many others discussed, the High North 
Dialogue offered a rich diversity of answers from a range of perspectives. Of these, three insights 
jumped out: the necessity of interdisciplinary approaches; the need to further engage youth in 
the region; and the importance of understanding the (at times) vastly different perspectives 
adopted by the Arctic countries. Far from being limited in their application, these three themes 
enjoyed currency across the gamut of different issues raised in Bodø.  
 
Interdisciplinary approaches as best practice 
In a region as complex and interrelated as the Arctic, it is of utmost importance to understand as 
much as possible about the connections between sectors, disciplines, and different forms of 
knowledge in order to operate effectively. These linkages take many forms, ranging from the 
effects of seismic surveying on marine life to how indigenous voices inform international 
governance in the region. Such complexities are obviously beyond the purview of one single 
discipline. The problems faced in the Arctic are not only transnational in nature but also 
interdisciplinary. Climate change, for example, cannot be tackled by legislation unless it is based 
on good evidence from a multiplicity of disciplines, spanning the gamut from economics to 
biology and everything in between.  
And while the importance of interdisciplinary perspectives is often recognized, as illustrated at 
this conference by the diversity of presentations, not all connections are equally valued. The 
industry-policy axis, for one, does very well. One need look no further than the creation of the 
Arctic Economic Council—the self-branded primary forum for interaction between the Arctic 
Council and the wider business community—and the support it has received from prominent 
politicians and executives across the Arctic countries to see evidence of as much. Furthermore, 
industry and science have a good link in that businesses operating in the Arctic must constantly 
adapt and innovate in order to remain competitive with those working in less harsh climes and 
with greater access to infrastructure and markets. These linkages are important in that they allow 
the construction of efficient policies and practices to foster well-regulated growth.  
A crucial connection is lacking between sciences and government, however. Yes, there is 
obviously communication between the two spheres, but it is nowhere near as entrenched—or 
as valued—as that between industry and government. Indeed, it often seems that government’s 
exposure to scientific innovation and research is moderated by industry. That is to say that 
industry will present what it is technologically capable of doing to government and lobby for the 
government to allow it to do so. This privileges certain sciences that revolve around engineering 
(in particular with hydrocarbon extraction) at the expense of others. Ultimately this creates a 
situation where a biologist working with polar bears does not have the same access to 
government officials as industry executives and thus cannot inform the relevant policies. This 
over-privileging of certain axes is problematic in that it inherently marginalizes some aspects of 
a problem within the policy-crafting process. The governance outcomes that result from this are, 
in turn, sub-optimal.  
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Things are further complicated as the region feels the effects of globalization. At the risk of 
reciting the same list of tired facts: trade flows are intensifying, supply chains stretch around the 
globe, and workers are increasingly mobile—and the Arctic is no exception. This has had 
profound impacts on governance and has ushered in a new “golden era of regulation” (Levi-Faur, 
2005). This has led to a constellation of new organizations, institutions, standards, and rules 
around the world that are redefining the notions of governance (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 
2006). As these institutions and regulations evolve, it is important that they take into account the 
perspectives offered by different disciplines—that they adopt best practices informed by the full 
run of information available. In the Arctic this translates into going beyond simply integrating 
different scientific disciplines; instead, it needs to involve indigenous knowledge, the spectrum 
of social scientific studies, and differing national perspectives.  
To its credit, the Artic has, for the most part, been fairly inclusive in this respect. This is even in 
spite of the dominance of the industry-policy axis. The Arctic Council, for example, is fairly 
progressive in that it gives indigenous peoples permanent representation; it also privileges a 
broad range of scientific research through their working groups. Nonetheless, there is still much 
work to be done. The relatively recent Polar Code, for example, does not include a ban on heavy 
fuel oil (also known as “bunker oil”). This is in spite of the Arctic Council’s 2009 Arctic Marine 
Shipping Assessment identifying a spill of heavy fuel oil as one of the top environmental threats 
to the region (Santos-Pedro et al., 2009). That the science is out there, that local communities 
have spoken about the importance of maintaining the northern climate, and that this did not 
translate into policy indicate that there is still a way to go towards implementing interdisciplinary 
best practices in the region.      
 
Connecting present and future  
It is no surprise to anyone in business that the importance of engaging with local stakeholders is 
paramount. Beyond simply playing into an “enterprise strategy” (Freeman, n.d.),  the need to 
evaluate and adjust to the needs of local communities is the difference between success and 
failure. A good example is that of Clyde River, Nunavut, where residents opposed seismic testing. 
The local Inuit appealed the decision to allow testing in the area on the basis that they were not 
adequately consulted, but their concerns were dismissed. The issue has since escalated and 
captured headlines around the world, casting a negative light on the still fresh-faced Trudeau 
government. As the mayor, Jerry Natanine, aptly reminded politicians: “Governments grant 
permits. Only communities grant permission” (Maloney, 2016). 
In this process, the question often arises as to who is a legitimate stakeholder. Often overlooked 
or dismissed is the youth voice: those who will have to live with the decisions made long after 
those who made it have moved on. Here the effort by the organizers of the High North Dialogue 
was much appreciated. The panel discussion by the “Future Leaders of the Arctic” was an 
invaluable, albeit all too rare, platform for voicing the concerns, frustrations, and aspirations of 
youth from across the Arctic states. Of interest, was the common theme linking them all: the fact 
that they did not feel empowered, that they did not feel their voices were being listened to.  
Echoing the disconnect between science and policy-makers, it seems that youth voices do not 
resonate with those in power at the moment. This is certainly true in the North American context, 
where the North is a minor concern at best, and the issues facing Northern youth are rarely 
considered. And, if the youth panel was any indication, it seems that this is not just a North 
American phenomenon but rather a pan-Arctic one. The presentation given by the young Sámi 
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leader, for example, made it clear that the concerns of Sámi youth are not being taken into 
account.  
Overall, it is heartening to see that things are changing and that conferences are taking youth 
concerns seriously. Perhaps even more exciting, however, is that the youth seem to be taking 
matters into their own hands. Across the Arctic you see young researchers and entrepreneurs 
forging new paths for a different Arctic one built to reflect their needs, wants, and desires—one 
that reflects their values. As the attention focused on the Arctic across the world by those seeking 
to exploit the region’s riches fades and wanes, it will be crucial to maintain this momentum so 
that Arctic communities remain sustainable, liveable, and vibrant.  
 
Many Arctics  
More than anything, what became clear throughout the conference was that there are many 
very different Arctics. This is true geographically, in that the North American Arctic is 
characterized by long periods of ice cover, extreme temperatures and sparse populations, 
whereas the European Arctic is ice-free all year long, much warmer, and (relatively) densely 
populated. But it is also true in that visions of the Arctic—what it means to a country and its 
people—differ greatly.  
Coming from Canada, as I do, there is a deep almost symbolic attachment to the country as an 
‘Arctic nation’. It is a way of differentiating ourselves not only from our southern neighbours but 
also from our British and French roots. That is not to say that we have forsaken the latter but 
instead have adapted them to our distinctly ‘northern’ context. As much is reflected in our 
national anthem, where we proudly sing about “the true North, strong and free” or in provincial 
politics, with Québec implementing its own vision of the Arctic with Plan Nord. This image most 
Canadians have of the Arctic is disingenuous, however. Instead, Canada is a country where a vast 
majority of the population is straddled along the southern border, and the north is romanticized 
by those who do not live there, while its original inhabitants are forgotten.  
This perception of the Arctic is a very specific one, to say the least, and very different from the 
ways the other Arctics are imagined. This was emphasized during the panel discussions, when 
one participant pointed out that he did not even realize he lived in the Arctic until he moved to 
Brussels. There, surrounded by European policy wonks and lobbyists keen on investing in the 
lucrative north, he came to appreciate that he was from northern Norway. For him, and as he 
pointed out for Norwegians more generally, the north is not some kind of romanticized, mythical 
place.  
Yet another perspective is that from Russia, often misunderstood and misinterpreted. The 
opportunity to collaborate and work with so many students from Russia was truly valuable. It 
allowed real, frank conversations about where the other side is coming from. Beyond the larger 
outstanding issues, such as the situation in the Ukraine (which rightfully should not find its way 
into the Arctic), it was great to have the chance to cut behind the propaganda of Western 
politicians and media outlets. Furthermore, it was refreshing to see such a different perspective 
on the Arctic. Conversations about environmental protection, indigenous rights, the role of the 
state, to what extent the military should play a role in the north, and the future of the Arctic inter 
alia, were interesting both in how Russian perspectives differed from those of the West but also, 
and perhaps more importantly, in how they often overlapped. It is easy for politicians to 
negatively portray others, in particular in North America where we do not have daily interactions 
with Russians, but in reality many Russians have the same concerns.  
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Why is this important? Why should we care about these different Arctics, imagined or otherwise? 
Practically, it is about knowing how to react in different environments. To give a concrete 
example, oil and gas have long been extracted in some parts of the Arctic, notably the Komi 
Republic and Nenets Autonomous Okrug in Russia, and Prudhoe Bay in Alaska (Henderson and 
Loe, 2014). Today, Norway, Russia, and Alaska all have significant extractive capacities in their 
Arctic regions. Despite several exploratory efforts, Greenland, Canada, and Iceland do not. This 
is the result of these vastly different Arctics—in terms of geography, societal attitudes, and 
governance structures.   
Indicative of these different Arctics, and one thing that was impressed upon me during the High 
North Dialogue, was the extent to which innovation is homegrown in the European Arctic—that 
is to say that it was built specifically for use in that region by people in that region. This stands in 
stark contrast to the situation in the Canadian Arctic, where technology is adapted from 
something in existence down south in order to ‘weatherproof’ it for the Arctic up north. All this 
illustrates that what is palatable and possible in one place might not be in another.  
The reason that these are so important, that these differences and similarities are worth paying 
attention to, is that they inform the way in which policy is crafted and business done. The lens 
through which someone sees the Arctic will obviously affect the ways in which they choose to 
engage and interact with the region. Appreciating these different viewpoints, how different 
stakeholders perceive a given situation, is crucial to successfully operate in the north. Beyond the 
differences, however, there are so many commonalities upon which cooperation can be built. It 
is important to appreciate these differences but appreciate them in a way that does not blow 
them out of proportion. 
 
Conclusion 
Far from being complete answers to the open-ended questions posed at the beginning of this 
reflection, these insights are a distillation of some of the discussion found at the High North 
Dialogue. Although there is a long way to go in resolving the many problems facing the region, 
progress is being made. Forums such as this one provide an important venue for discussion to 
take place and thoughts to be exchanged. Importantly, this is happening between a diversity of 
stakeholders ranging from scientists to politicians, analysts to indigenous peoples, and local 
communities to environmental activists. By tapping into the creativity of this broad range of 
stakeholders, and looking to the future with an appreciation of the very different needs of 
different parts of the Arctic, the potential is significant. It is now a matter of translating these 
conversations into action.   
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HIGH NORTH DIALOGUE 
Hema Nadarajah 
 
Introduction 
The PhD course (DR 437E) on “Governance in the High North: Implications for Arctic private and 
public sector” conducted by Nord University Business School from 23rd to 27th May 2016 was held 
in Bodø, Norway in conjunction with the High North Dialogue Conference.  The course aimed to 
impart multidisciplinary and multi-theoretical research methodologies that can be utilized when 
studying High North public, global and corporate governance. The conference, entitled 
“Norwegian-Russian Partnership in Business Education and Research: Impacts on individuals, 
institutions, and society”, aimed to provide a real-world application of the governance issues in 
the High North.  
The course was conducted via a scenario-building exercise that aimed to create projections of 
the High North in 2030 and the various implications for different sectors. My group, Group 9, 
tackled issues on natural gas. Each PhD student was assigned the supervision of approximately 
ten Master’s students. The course and conference has imparted several lessons that will be of 
particular use to my own research, which will be elaborated below. This report will then discuss 
the following four of these in detail: the role of scientific knowledge in the High North, 
supervisory skills, scenario-building and agenda conflicts between young researchers and senior 
academics.  
 
Research Background 
The overarching theme in my research interests is the interface between scientific research and 
policy formulation in the Arctic. I then narrow my focus to the role of observers and certain 
epistemic communities. Although I do not, as yet, have a specific research question for my PhD 
dissertation, I am exploring several research topics, which will be discussed briefly below. 
 
Science-policy interface 
My research interest concerns the political processes of translating scientific research into 
international policy and cooperative management in the Arctic. Scientific cooperation has been 
at the centre of collaboration efforts between Arctic states and, most recently, observer states1 
                                                     
1 In order be accepted into the Arctic Council (AC) as an observer, applicants were required to fulfil the following 
criteria: support the Council’s objectives as defined in the Ottawa declaration; acknowledge the Arctic states’ 
sovereignty in the region; recognize the legal framework applying to the Arctic Ocean, particularly the Law of the 
Sea; respect the traditions and interests of the Arctic indigenous communities; demonstrate a political and financial 
ability to contribute to the work of the Arctic indigenous communities; show interest and expertise pertaining to the 
Council’s work; and show an interest in working with members and permanent participants to elevate Arctic concerns 
in international organizations.  The role of observers in the AC is largely be limited to observing the work of the 
Council, attending meetings by invitation, contributing via the working groups, task forces and expert groups, and 
proposing projects and making financial contributions (Observer Manual, 2015). 
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to the Arctic Council.2 I am exploring two particularly important forms of cooperation. The first 
concerns how technical research, mostly on marine science, conducted by observer states to the 
Arctic Council, is translated into international policy on a broader scale. By analysing these 
processes, my research will contribute to the broader literature on the science and policy 
interface and advance solutions that can assist in formulating and implementing sustainable and 
effective policies. As part of this work, I will examine the environmental and socio-economic 
implications of these research processes and outcomes, as well as what they mean for key Arctic 
stakeholders—Arctic states and indigenous communities—as well as for the respective observer 
states’ Arctic strategies. This could have implications for the Arctic Council, including its approach 
to applications for observer status.  
Politicization of climate change 
The second important form of cooperation concerns the global implications of the politicization 
of climate change by Arctic states and observers. The consequences of the Arctic’s biophysical 
changes on global marine systems cannot be overemphasized. Almost every conference or media 
release pertaining to the Arctic usually includes the now clichéd phrase ‘What happens in the 
Arctic does not stay in the Arctic’. Moreover, almost every strategy or policy paper released by 
Arctic Council member states or observers begins with the dire consequences for the region of 
warming temperatures.  
The first, and usually the most cited, concern is sea-level rise, since there is an enormous amount 
of land-based ice in the Arctic, including but not limited to the Greenland ice sheet. The melting 
of even some of this ice would severely impact Small Island Developing States (SIDs) such as 
Kiribati, which are already facing the consequences of warming temperatures, for example 
extreme weather events and coastal erosion. However, there has been little engagement 
between Arctic and non-Arctic actors, such as SIDs, on this matter. Furthermore, research by 
observer states has been largely skewed towards economic prospects in the Arctic that could 
result from sea ice melt. In the course of my research, I will examine the policy implications of 
climate change research in an Arctic environment that is already highly stressed and where the 
changes have truly global implications—including for the conduct and management of 
international politics.  
 
Science diplomacy and epistemic communities 
I am working on exploring the role of science diplomacy in the Arctic. Some questions that I aim 
to answer include the following: the extent of scientific knowledge required to make diplomatic 
judgements and decisions; the role of scientists at national and international levels; and the 
dynamics at play between the various epistemic communities of diplomats and scientists. 
Arctic exploration has been pursued for centuries, not only for reasons of conquest but also for 
cartographic and scientific reasons (Wallis and Arnold, 2011). In recent decades, scientific 
                                                     
2 The Arctic Council, a high-level intergovernmental forum, comprises of eight Arctic Member states—Canada, 
Finland, Iceland, Sweden, Russia, Norway, the United States and Denmark (by way of Greenland)—and six 
Permanent Participants made up of the region’s indigenous groups; the Council serves as a forum that seeks to address 
issues faced by these countries (Ottawa Declaration, 1996). It addresses issues on sustainable development and 
environmental protection that are faced by the Arctic states and the indigenous people of the region (IUCN 2001). As 
outlined in the Ottawa Declaration (1996), the Council “explicitly excludes military security”.  The six working groups 
within the Council address issues such as emergency preparedness, Arctic contaminants, conservation of biodiversity, 
monitoring and protecting the environment and sustainable development in the region (Ottawa Declaration, 1996). 
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research in the region has intensified, primarily due to the growing concerns over warming 
temperatures. Scientific cooperation has existed in the region for nearly a century.  One of the 
earliest examples of successful regional international cooperation with roots in science emerged 
out of the 1911 North Pacific Sealing Convention, when Japan, Russia, the United States and 
Great Britain (on behalf of Canada) aimed to rehabilitate the northern fur seals’ population in the 
Bering Sea and to resolve a potential resource conflict (Young, 2000). In 2013, two legally binding 
agreements were signed by Arctic Council members—the Agreement on Cooperation on 
Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic and the Agreement on Cooperation 
on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (Arctic Council Agreements, 
2015). In May 2014, the Arctic Council established a task force on scientific cooperation, and an 
agreement is to be discussed at the next ministerial meeting in 2017. The agreement would cover 
many important aspects of conducting Arctic research, which often extends beyond national 
borders. It could cover the movement of people and scientific equipment, improving data 
sharing, access to research infrastructure, facilities and research areas, advancing science 
education. In April 2015 another task force on marine cooperation was established. At that time 
it also adopted a Framework for Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emissions 
Reductions (Arctic Council SAO Plenary, 2015). In line with these agreements, the conference 
highlighted several times the importance of scientific cooperation in building diplomatic ties. As 
such, several presentations were highly topical for my own research. 
Climate change has altered and continues to alter various environments on a range of spatial and 
temporal scales and, as such, the geopolitics of these regions is also changing. The melting of 
Arctic sea ice, for example, has made economic prospects such as shipping, fisheries and resource 
extraction in the region increasingly feasible (Gautier et al., 2009). Given the highly volatile 
climatic impact on the Arctic ice, natural resources and indigenous communities, Arctic 
governance is complex, and a more polycentric approach has taken shape in recent years. 
Bilateral and multilateral scientific cooperation has been a focus in the region for several decades 
now and has gained even greater momentum in recent years. During the last two major Arctic 
science conferences—ArcticNet in 2015 and the Arctic Science Summit in 2016—the focus was 
mostly on establishing deeper international scientific cooperation and integrating the resulting 
scientific research with sound policies to address the multitude of changes occurring in the 
region.  Although there have been discussions about the need for greater scientific cooperation 
in the Arctic, the literature on this form of collaboration has been limited in international 
relations, let alone political science. Extensive scientific cooperation can exist, but what are its 
effects on the policy-making processes and institutional and epistemic community dynamics?  
This project aims to examine what international scientific cooperation signifies for the policy-
making process in the Arctic. I answer this by addressing three subsidiary questions; firstly, to 
what extent have epistemic communities contributed to scientific cooperation? Secondly, what 
are the outcomes of increasing scientific cooperation in the Arctic among members, participants 
and observers and its influence on policy outcomes? Have the outcomes been positive, negative 
or have there been none? Thirdly, has increased international scientific cooperation helped to 
narrow the science-policy gap? There has been some discussion on the role of scientific 
cooperation in narrowing science-policy gaps, but no comprehensive work has as yet been 
carried out to actually show that international scientific cooperation does lead to an effective 
collaboration between scientific research and the policy process. Answering this will help to 
address the challenges faced in the ongoing deepening international scientific cooperation as 
well as to highlight the gaps between policy-makers and scientific researchers that have 
prevented more effective solutions from being formulated. 
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The topic of epistemic communities will take its analytical point of departure from the literature 
on epistemic communities by Peter Haas (1992) and other International Relations scholars. The 
focus will be on the Arctic Council and the networks of expert communities that provide their 
science-based advice during the decision-making processes. The Arctic Council (which will be 
introduced later) has increasingly become prominent, and when six non-regional states were 
granted the status of observers to the council, the gravitas of a changing Arctic geopolitical 
sphere was further amplified and the council’s legitimacy as the leading organization for Arctic 
affairs strengthened.   
A constructivist framework works best in answering the question of scientific cooperation, as it 
takes into consideration the role of non-state actors—networks of experts (academics and think 
tanks for example)—which form the unit of analysis in this project. The underlying assumption 
here is that cooperation does exist and is an approach that all Arctic members have been 
observed to take. This is evident in the fact that scientific cooperation existed during the two 
prominent military events in recent history—the Cold War and Russia’s annexation of Crimea, 
which will be further discussed below. Current analyses of the role of policy-making are more 
often than not state-centric and frequently take the form of realist or liberal approaches. A 
constructivist framework allows for exploring the role of epistemic communities in international 
scientific cooperation and the subsequent policy-making process. Unlike rationalist approaches 
of neo-liberalism and neo-realism, a constructivist approach that integrates the concept of 
epistemic communities takes into account actors that would otherwise have been omitted in the 
analysis of international policy-making processes (Bukhari, 2004).  
 
Asian observers’ role 
Another area of research interest is the collaboration on Arctic-related issues between China, 
South Korea and Japan, which was first officially broached during the 2015 Trilateral Summit 
between the three neighbours.   Such collaboration is almost akin to that which takes place 
between the US and Russia in the context of the latter’s annexation of Crimea and, going further 
back, the Cold War. The three states have had a troubled history, one that surfaces frequently 
and is carefully trodden down. Economic competition and China’s rise to become the region’s 
superpower has only made their relationship more complex. However, the Arctic, as has been 
the case among the states in the region, has served to be a platform of cooperation. One question 
that begs to be answered is whether this recent China-Japan-South Korea Arctic cooperation is 
an extension of what the Arctic Council represents, as a forum for cooperation among states with 
a troubled past, or a strategy by these states that assures themselves of greater involvement?  
Scientific research forms the core of these states’ cooperation. Understanding how such 
research, by a sub-group within observer states, translates into broader policies in the Arctic 
would be useful for understanding the potential limitations and opportunities for observers as 
well as for member states.  
 
Singapore in the Arctic  
This area of research analyses whether seeking and acquiring observer status influences the 
Arctic policy of non-regional states in ways that benefit the Arctic countries, thus justifying their 
grant of observer status. I use Singapore, a recent observer to the council, as a case study and 
analyse changes to its Arctic strategy through recent years. To determine whether admission to 
the council has been central in the net benefits to the members, the analysis will be limited to 
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the three periods of application—before deciding to apply, during application and after receiving 
observer status—in order to discern whether admission to the council has contributed net 
benefits to the members. Singapore is used as a case study for two reasons. Firstly, unlike its East 
Asian counterparts, Singapore’s interests in the Arctic have primarily concerned maritime 
matters and capacity-building solutions, rather than the energy potential of the north (Storey, 
2014). Secondly, as an island state situated one degree north of the equator, Singapore has been 
referred to as an “unlikely applicant” by many, given its sheer distance from the Arctic (Solli et 
al., 2013). With a land area of about 700 square kilometres, Singapore is about 148 times smaller 
than Iceland, the smallest Arctic member state, and is situated more than 7200 km away from 
the Pole. Furthermore, unlike Japan, Korea, China and India, which have had long running polar 
research programmes, Singapore’s interest in the region is relatively recent. The involvement of 
non-regional states has raised several concerns, such as their potential to undermine the 
dominancy of Arctic members in the region, as well as to overshadow the position of the 
permanent participants within the council (Stokke, 2013). In the case of Singapore, we will see 
that this has not been the case. On the contrary, admitting the equatorial state has only increased 
the legitimacy of the council and its members’ primacy in the region and strengthened the 
capacity of the permanent participants.  
 
Learning points from the PhD Course 
 
Role of scientific knowledge in businesses/academia  
The importance of scientific knowledge came up frequently during the conference. Dr Rasmus 
Bertelsen’s lecture on knowledge-based Sino-Nordic Arctic relations was particularly valuable to 
my own research on science diplomacy. Dr Bertelsen introduced a different perspective of 
China’s role in the Arctic. Although to many Arctic members, China’s involvement in the region is 
often perceived to be a threat, Dr Bertelsen provided a counter argument, stating that the 
political and economic development in the Arctic has allowed China to enter the region in a less 
threatening way and that the take-away lesson was an increased understanding and knowledge 
of how to integrate a rising China in regions around the world. He stated that there were two 
major shifts in the last 25 years: one was environmental in nature and the other, political-
economic. The former was in reference to the changing climate and the latter to the rise of China 
and other emerging economies. He then went on to look at the two common lenses, through 
which the power transition in the Arctic can be viewed through the lenses of Mearsheimer’s 
realism or Nye’s constructivism. He finally ended with an overview of science diplomacy and what 
it meant in China’s case. Referencing Abram de Swaan’s Words of the Worlds, the lecture was 
also useful in providing a guideline for formulating a researchable hypothesis.  
Given my research interests in the role of observers, with particular reference to the Asian states, 
and in scientific diplomacy in the Arctic, Dr Bertelsen’s contribution was especially useful in 
deepening my understanding on the topic. 
 
Supervisory role  
Aside from a strong understanding of academic knowledge and writing, teaching and supervision 
very much form a part of the core skills required by an academic. Supervising the team of ten 
Master’s students of various academic backgrounds and nationalities required being able to 
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communicate and manage effectively. The team that I supervised faced some challenges in 
listening to each other, mostly due to different sets of expectations and levels of understanding 
of the subject matter. Students were each experts on different geographic regions of the Arctic.  
Furthermore, they had various levels of understanding on the current state of natural gas 
extraction and may not have completely understood what was expected of them during the 
scenario-building exercise. I learned to manage the various expectations of the students and 
aimed to help them communicate effectively with each other.   
 
Thinking ahead—Scenario-building  
Sometimes, in all the eagerness of trying to answer a question, a researcher might tend to ignore 
the long-term implications of the particular research. The scenario-building segment of the 
course was an extremely useful exercise in understanding where the research we are conducting 
fits into the bigger picture in the long run.  
Dr Indra Øverland’s lecture on the uncertainty of change exemplified this issue with several cases 
of companies that had failed to foresee changes. He went on to highlight the importance of how 
“having to look back is to look forward”. Dr Anatoli Bourmistrov gave the second lecture on how 
to build scenarios. His lecture in particular was useful as he examined the various philosophies of 
foresight—the intelligent machine versus the creative machine. The former is grounded on 
strategic thinking, based on rigorous, analytical and quantitative methodology, while the latter 
requires imagining a future situation and inventing ways to make it happen. Being aware of these 
two forms helps in formulating a research topic, as an ideal topic would be one that falls 
somewhere between the two ends of the spectrum.  
 
Diverging views between young researchers and other stakeholders 
During the conference, it was valuable to hear senior academics and business owners bring to 
the discussions their respective perspective on a diversity of Arctic issues, ranging from mining 
to climate change. The various experts referred to the importance of young professionals being 
heard. Some panels did provide such an opportunity. What was lacking, however, was a 
discussion between young professionals and business or political representatives. Although this 
might have taken place on the sidelines, it would have been useful for there to have been a formal 
panel for this purpose.  
During the panel discussion between the Future Arctic Leaders, young researchers, activists and 
a journalist, the importance of environmental issues and climate change impacts in the Arctic 
was voiced. As important and commonly discussed as climate change is, the topic was barely 
touched upon during the conference among other stakeholders. Bearing in mind that the 
presenters were mostly representatives from various businesses, the minimal coverage of such 
a critical issue shows where the priorities of large businesses generally lie, in terms of corporate 
responsibility.  
Another goal of my PhD topic would be to contribute to the ongoing discourse on climate change 
and other environmental issues in the Arctic. Hearing from these various stakeholders was highly 
beneficial for gauging what my work should be more focused on.  
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Conclusion 
 
The conference helped me gain a deeper understanding of the complexities surrounding various 
issues in the Arctic. Learning about the long-term potential outcomes of various issues, ranging 
from tourism to natural gas extraction also allowed me to gain a broader overall understanding. 
Aside from academic knowledge, supervising as a PhD student further honed critical skills such 
as teamwork building and communication. In terms of my own research, hearing from various 
stakeholders helped me to better orient my own research question.  
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PATCHWORK COPERATION REGIME BETWEEN NORWAY AND RUSSIA IN THE SPHERE OF OIL 
Irina Zhilina 
 
Introduction  
Since the end of World War II, interdependence among states has been growing, despite strong 
polarization between the Western and Eastern Blocs during the Cold War. Cooperation between 
Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea resulted in the construction of a bilateral management 
regime for joint fish stocks. It demonstrated that common problems should be and can be tackled 
jointly. In addition, bilateral Norwegian–Russian cooperation created an institutional link 
between East and West, which has become an important element of what we now call Arctic 
governance. 
Today we witness offshore oil and gas development becoming a new industrial activity in the 
Barents Sea. It is accompanied by many risks of transboundary character and, thus, calls for 
bilateral cooperation. After a dramatic collapse of oil prices, and sanctions imposed on Russian 
offshore development in the Arctic, the prospects of the future of the Barents Sea as a petroleum 
province were seriously questioned. However, stabilization of the oil prices, a new US 
presidential administration, as well as resumed Norwegian–Russian dialogue at the level of 
petroleum ministers, signals that the story of bilateral cooperation on oil and gas activities will 
continue.  
The role of Norwegian–Russian cooperation has been widely studied by Arctic governance 
scholars as an example of a successful management regime of natural resources (Hønneland, 
2010; Hønneland & Stokke, 2007; Young, 1999). All of these, however, focused on the well-
established fisheries sector. The purpose of this article is to contribute to the discussion on 
regime formation processes in the Arctic by analysing the initiatives of Norwegian–Russian 
cooperation in the area of offshore hydrocarbon development.  
Based on a comparative historical analysis of the economic and political reasons for offshore oil 
and gas development in the Barents Sea, the paper will address the following questions: Why 
does cooperation take place in the first place and why do Norway and Russia choose to 
cooperate?  
The paper is organized in four main parts. Firstly, I give an overview of the theoretical 
background, based on the concepts of governance and international regime formation. Secondly, 
I will briefly outline the history of Norwegian–Russian cooperation in the field of oil and gas and 
then I will take a closer look at the bilateral collaboration initiatives constituting a patchwork 
regime.  Finally, I will discuss the factors that shape the future scope and direction of oil and gas 
exploration and exploitation in the Barents region.  
This paper is written within the framework of frames of the PhD course, “PhD course – 
Governance in the High North: Implications for Arctic private and public sector”, organized by 
Nord University in Bodø in 2016. 
 
Regime formation as part of global governance 
My previous work was based on regime formation theory, which originates from international 
relations studies. Since the PhD course was devoted to governance theory, I decided to look at 
these theories side by side, trying to understand what implications they offer for the analysis of 
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international politics and its many facets. Governance and regime theories overlap in many 
respects. Both theories are based on the same concepts of order and stability; both involve 
participation, negotiation and coordination of various stakeholders, whose interests and 
activities may coincide or collide. International regimes, as well as governance arrangements, are 
problem-driven and can be interpreted as efforts to manage joint affairs. The difference between 
governance and regime lies in the subject in focus. Governance theory emerged from the 
research on European integration; the governance perspective cross-references domestic and 
international policy agendas, which have been traditionally regarded as separate domains. 
Regime theory has studied the institutional usefulness.  
Krasner defined regime as “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations” (Krasner, 1982). At the same time, Young introduced a similar definition of regime “as 
multilateral agreements among states which aim to regulate national actions within an issue 
area” (Young, 1982). Governance theory focuses on the “strategy, process, procedure or 
programme for controlling, regulating and managing the problem” (Lemke, 2007). “Governance 
is the sum of many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common 
affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be 
accommodated and co-operative action taken” (The Commission on Global Governance, 1995). 
While regime theory puts emphasis on the desired standards of behaviour agreed by actors, 
governance theory draws attention to the complex structures that are built up and through which 
the actors operate. 
In the context of Arctic affairs, I understand governance as a broader framework than regime. It 
can include different regimes that coexist and interact with each other. One may find the example 
of the UN Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) contradicting this approach. Indeed, UNCLOS is 
a governing legal system that regulates numerous issue areas. However, even top-level 
international agreement as a legal document alone remains only part of a bigger picture, a part 
of Arctic governance. In fact, UNCLOS gives explicit instructions that states should manage 
conflicting interest through bilateral or multilateral cooperation agreements and thus are obliged 
to cooperate. Its realization depends solemnly on the state actors. It does not mean that a regime 
can be realized through various governance structures; rather, I suggest that it can be realized 
within the structures by the numerous actors. 
International regimes and governance can be multi-level and multi-actor, but only governance 
encompasses numerous “issue areas”.  According to James Rosenau, “Regimes exist only in well-
defined areas, whereas governance is inseparable from the global order and is not confined to 
single sphere of endeavour” (Lemke, 2007). In a similar way, I see my study of the formation of a 
joint oil and gas management regime as part of a bigger multi-dimensional, multi-level and multi-
actor process, where the Barents Sea region is only a subsystem of an overarching complex 
architecture.  
 The mission of effective governance is to reconcile these cross-sectoral interests in a democratic 
manner, with all stakeholders being included. However, “It does not occur in a vacuum, it works 
within a minimum institutional framework” (Smouts, 1998). Therefore, governance is steered by 
regimes, which may either facilitate or drive back the development of the issue area. Regimes 
may also conflict or overlap. Therefore, international regimes can be regarded as a means of 
governance (Stokke, 1997). 
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The role of the petroleum industry in Norway and Russia 
Norway and Russia are two oil-producing countries with highly different backgrounds and 
preconditions. Petroleum production in Russia dates back to the 19th century, whereas the 
history of Norwegian oil and gas is much shorter. Russian production has mainly been onshore; 
in Norway, however, all oil and gas activities have taken place offshore. Moreover, the Russian 
and Norwegian petroleum sectors are characterized by different actors and institutional 
frameworks. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian petroleum industry was part of a 
centrally planned economy, whereas the Norwegian system has always been more market-
based. Despite fundamental differences between the Norwegian and Russian petroleum 
industries, the two countries also share similar characteristics. The oil and gas sector plays a 
pivotal role in the national economies. As of 2013, the oil and gas sector accounted for 68% of 
Russia’s total exports and more than 50% of federal budget revenues (EIA, 2014; World Bank, 
2014). The corresponding figures for Norway were 49% and 29%, respectively (NMPE/NPD, 
2014). Nowadays, both countries are slowly exhausting their hydrocarbon fields that have been 
in operation since the second half of the 20th century. According to a BP statistical report, since 
2004 Russia has lost its positions in both oil and gas production. Today it is the third largest world 
oil producer after the United States and Saudi Arabia and the second largest gas producer after 
the US. As for Norway, oil production figures have gone down around 60% since 2004; however, 
gas production has increased by 36% (BP, 2015). Moreover, both Russia and Norway are major 
suppliers to the European market, linked to the receivers by a comprehensive network of 
pipelines. As Europe is diversifying its trading partners as well as shifting towards alternative 
energy sources, it is crucial for both countries to secure their positions as exporters. Hence, the 
development of the oil and gas sectors in Norway and Russia is an overriding political concern. 
By the end of the 20th century, the oil and gas industries in both countries had begun to expand 
northwards. This was stimulated by both international and domestic reasons. On the one hand, 
such international developments as the adoption of the United Nations Convention on Law of 
the Sea UNCLOS and the extension of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) to up to 200 nautical 
miles spurred expansion of economic activities on the continental shelf as a tool for sovereignty 
projection. On the other hand, it has become clear that the existing production fields are getting 
exhausted. Launching greenfield became crucial in securing future economic growth. In the mid-
1970s, the Soviet Union commenced offshore exploration works in the Barents Sea; the 
Norwegian exploration campaign started in the first half of the 1980s. Soon the two industries of 
the two countries met face to face. 
 
The Norwegian–Russian petroleum cooperation initiatives 
Over the last few decades, offshore oil and gas development has emerged as a new industrial 
activity in the Barents Sea region. The petroleum resources of the Arctic region emerged in the 
national strategic thinking of both countries long before international community set its sights 
on the Arctic’s offshore potential, as the first exploration activities in the Barents Sea began in 
the 1970s. 
The reassuring estimations of the hydrocarbon potential of the Arctic continental shelf appeared 
in the years of unprecedented energy consumption growth and high oil prices, which reinforced 
national interests in offshore development. The US Geological Survey concluded that the Arctic 
continental shelf is an area with substantial hydrocarbon deposits, containing up to 30% of the 
world’s discovered fossil fuels, and will remain a major petroleum province in the future (USGS, 
2000, 2008).  
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Cooperation in the field of oil and gas between Norway and Russia was initiated by Mikhail 
Gorbachev in 1987. In his famous Murmansk Speech, he invited Norway “…to form mixed firms 
and enterprises for developing oil and gas deposits of the shelf of our northern seas” (Gorbachev, 
1987).  By the following year, the Norwegian company Norsk Hydro had already opened its office 
in Moscow. In the same year, 1988, a remarkable event happened on the Russian continental 
shelf in the Barents Sea: one of the world's largest natural gas fields, named Shtokman, was 
discovered. However, Gorbachev’s initiative was not realized until after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union.  In the 1990s, with a new Russian political and economic environment, it was the 
industrial sector that pushed forward for joint offshore projects. Although the Shtokman project 
did not become a success story, as the development never took off, it brought Norwegian and 
Russian companies together and became a driving force for joint efforts over the next 20 years.  
The petroleum cooperation between Norway and Russia has been developing fragmentarily. On 
a business level, Norwegian–Russian cooperation is based on joint offshore exploration and 
extraction operations3, mutual declarations on environment protection4 and on less formalized 
formats of the industrial links of The Norwegian-Russian Chamber of Commerce  and Norwegian 
Oil and Gas Partners (INTSOK). At the governmental level, the cooperation operates in the frames 
of bilateral, multilateral and international agreements.  
Bilateral agreements (2005 Joint Declaration on Energy Cooperation, 2010 Delimitation Treaty, 
1994 bilateral OSR Agreement, Joint Contingency Plan managed by Joint Steering Group since 
2006) 
Multilateral agreements/regional organizations (2013 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil 
Pollution and Response, EPPR working group of the AC) 
International agreements (UNCLOS, MARPOL, OSPAR, International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, OPRC, Polar Code). 
The growing interest of industry stakeholders in oil and gas development in the Arctic paralleled 
the formalization of bilateral cooperation on a governmental level.  While business stakeholders 
were uniting their efforts in planning actual offshore operations, national governments started 
to develop different cooperation areas, such as environment protection, oil spill preparedness 
and response, and search and rescue operations. These arrangements are aimed at reducing the 
risks of petroleum operations to an acceptable level before the operations actually start. 
 
Different dimensions of oil and gas cooperation 
Environmental cooperation 
Environmental cooperation between Norway and Russia was established in 1988 and renewed 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This agreement established the Joint Russian-Norwegian 
Environmental Commission and, in the 2000s, petroleum activities appeared on its agenda. The 
Commission has been working on unified environmental standards for the oil and gas industry, 
the harmonization of methods for environmental monitoring and environmental impact 
assessment, and developing measures to ensure safe exploration and drilling operations on the 
                                                     
3 For example, Shareholder and Operating Agreements establishing joint ventures for the four offshore Russian licence 
areas, Agreement on joint bidding for licences in the Norwegian section of the Barents Sea. 
4 For example, the Declaration on Protection of the Environment and Biodiversity for Oil and Gas Exploration and 
Development on the Russian Arctic Continental Shelf signed by Rosneft, ExxonMobil, Statoil and Eni. 
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continental shelf (Bambulyak et al., 2015). A new bilateral agreement to exchange seismic data 
from the areas around the demarcation line in the Barents Sea was negotiated under the auspices 
of the Joint Commission. negotiate.  
 
Search and rescue cooperation 
Norway and Russia have a long history of working together on search and rescue (SAR) matters 
under the umbrella of the bilateral 1995 Barents agreement5 and the regional 2008 BEAC 
agreement6. These arrangements target many emergency situations – oil spills among others7.  
Emergency response operations refer inter alia to “search and rescue efforts and other 
activities…undertaken in order to limit or eliminate material and environmental consequences”8. 
The agreements establish points of contact between many relevant agencies on each side, 
provide procedures for the notification of emergencies, mutual assistance, and border crossings.  
In addition to bilateral and regional agreements, Norway and Russia participate in binding the 
2011 SAR agreement9, signed under the auspices of the Arctic Council. This clarifies the spatial 
division of responsibility, lines of communication among relevant agencies, and sets procedures 
for border-crossing during rescue operations. The agreement became a part of the Arctic 
cooperation architecture. However, in the context of Russian-Norwegian SAR cooperation in the 
Barents Sea, it has limited practical significance for improving the efficiency of SAR operations. It 
focuses on the general coordination of activities, rather than on organizational innovations, 
resources or infrastructure (Rottem, 2014). 
 
Oil spill response cooperation  
Cooperation on Oil spill response cooperation (OSR) between Russia and Norway, in respect of 
environmental protection from oil and gas pollution, stems from the adoption of the 
International Convention on Oil and Gas Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC) in 
1990. At the regional level, OSR cooperation is incorporated into the work of the Arctic Council 
and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAR). Whereas the Arctic Council contributes to policy-
making at the international level and is focused on scientific cooperation and recommendations’ 
provision, the BEAR provides a platform for joint exercises and therefore contributes to 
cooperation at the operational level (Bambulyak et al., 2015; Sydnes & Sydnes, 2012). On a 
bilateral level, the cooperation is based on the1994 Agreement on Oil Spill Response in the 
Barents Sea, the Joint Contingency Plan of 1994, and the Memorandum of 2006. The regime 
developed over time from a common understanding of the importance of the joint efforts into 
the institutionalization of a decision-making process and the conducting of joint exercises. The 
cooperation regime was also strengthened by standardizing the procedures to handle oil spills. 
In other words, the regime developed “from paper to practice” (Young, 1999). As such, the 
problem-solving capacity of the OSR regime has never been tested in a real-life situation due to 
                                                     
5  Agreement on Search and Rescue of Persons in Distress in the Barents Sea.  The agreement is founded in the International Convention on 
Maritime Search and Rescue from 1979 and is an extension of an agreement between Norway and Russia from 1957. 
6 Agreement between the Governments in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region on Cooperation within the Field of Emergency Prevention, Preparedness 
and Response 
7 These include traffic accidents, forest fires, tourism-related accidents, fires in open cabins, floods and ice plugs, and industrial and chemical 
accidents http://www.beac.st/en/Working-Groups/BEAC-Working-Groups/Rescue-Cooperation 
8https://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/Agreement_Emergency_Prevention_Preparedness_and_Response_English.pdf 
9 The Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic  
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the absence of major accidents (Sydnes & Sydnes, 2012). Norway and Russia are also parties to 
the 2013 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response in the 
Arctic, signed under the auspices of the Arctic Council and members of the Emergency 
Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group of the Arctic Council. 
 
The 2010 Delimitation Agreement 
Before Statoil pulled out of the Shtokman project, Russian–Norwegian relations reached another 
milestone in the signing in 2010 of the treaty on maritime delimitation and cooperation in the 
Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean. This is the only bilateral document that refers to the 
exploitation and exploration of hydrocarbon resources in the Barents Sea as such. The agreement 
split the disputed area into two almost equal parts and opened new possibilities for petroleum 
development in a previously unavailable area. Importantly, the agreement covers the issue of 
transboundary hydrocarbon deposits. It states that oil and gas fields extending across the 
Russian–Norwegian border should be exploited conjointly as a unit, and the profits should be 
shared proportionally (Regjeringen.no, 2010). As soon as the treaty came into force, seismic 
surveys commenced on the Norwegian side of the border, with Russian surveys starting one year 
later. Nevertheless, it remains unclear how can the development of the transboundary deposit 
can be realized in practice because of the differences in Norwegian and Russian licensing 
legislation (Bambulyak et al., 2015). 
 
Business2business cooperation 
The beginning of the 2000s was marked by a bundle of cooperation initiatives in the Arctic 
between Russian and Norwegian companies. They laid the ground for the notoriously known 
Shtokman framework agreement between Gazprom, Statoil and Total to develop the 
infrastructure for future exploitation activities. Although the project never took off, it 
paradoxically served as a catalyst for extended cooperation between Norway and Russia in many 
ways.  It demonstrated both the challenges and the opportunities of international business 
interaction with a Russian state-owned company in the very technology- and capital-demanding 
environment of the Stockman project. Consequently, Statoil and Norsk Hydro strengthened their 
presence in Russia and helped establish Murmanshelf and Sozvezdye, two associations of Russian 
oil and gas industry suppliers, to prepare the Russian companies for participation in the 
Shtokman project and other oil and gas projects on the Arctic shelf. Norwegian companies, such 
as Aker Kværner, FMC, Det Norske Veritas, Reinertsen, and Ølen Betong, set up subsidiaries in 
Russia. The Norwegian–Russian Chamber of Commerce was also established, and INTSOK—
Norwegian Oil and Gas Partners—an organization promoting the internationalization of the 
Norwegian offshore supply industry, began to organize annual Norwegian–Russian oil and gas 
conferences.  INTSOK also became a platform for the research project, RU-NO Barents. The goal 
was to identify the main technological needs for operation on the Arctic Continental shelf in a 
sustainable and responsible manner. As governmental bodies were also participating in the 
project’s activities,  the project  itself has become an integrated part of the official Norwegian–
Russian energy dialogue (INTSOK, 2015). A project on Arctic oil-spill response technologies, run 
by the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (JIP OGP), became another example of 
business collaboration in research. 
In 2012, Rosneft took the lead and launched new initiatives to bolster the company and become 
a global energy player. Rosneft signed comprehensive strategic cooperation agreements with 
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Statoil on joint offshore operations on the Russian Arctic shelf.  Rosneft’s strategic joint ventures 
comprise large swathes of the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk. Soon after that, Rosneft and 
Statoil signed anther agreement on joint bidding for licences on the Norwegian continental shelf.  
At the beginning of the 2010s, Rosneft established a subsidiary in Norway and was prequalified 
as an operator on the Norwegian continental shelf. Shortly after, Lukoil also opened an office in 
Oslo. Thus, two Russian companies have become licence holders and gained access to the 
upstream activities in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea. Winning entry into the Norwegian 
sector in competition with many other players was an achievement. Rosneft received a 20% share 
of the production licence PL713 (Pingvin), together with Edison, North Energy and Statoil (the 
operator). Exploration drilling began in August 2014; however, the discovered gas reservoir was 
assessed as non-commercial (Statoil, 2014). Lukoil joined two projects: the company received 
30% of the production licence PL719 (Scarecrow) in cooperation with North Energy and Centrica 
Resources (the operator) and 20% in PL708 (Seiland East) together with Edison, North Energy and 
Lundin Petroleum (the operator). The drilling in the latter block also turned out to be 
unsuccessful for Lukoil. Nevertheless, Rosneft and Lukoil tool part in 23rd licence round for blocks 
in the Norwegian continental shelf, along with two more companies that have Russian 
ownership, namely DEA Norge and E.On E&P Norge. In 2016 Lukoil received a 20% stake in  
Fedynsky High [PL858], a licence located  in the Barents Sea along the Norwegian–Russian 
borderline (Staalesen, 2016).  
 
Formation of “patchwork” regulatory regime 
Globalization and intensifying interdependence erased the borders between international and 
domestic agendas. This was followed by an increasing level of cooperation around the globe by 
the end of the 20th century. With the adoption of numerous international documents, the 
intensification of globalization, as well as the emergence of numerous non-state actors in 
international relations, the Arctic region also entered a “golden era of regulation” (EIA, 2014; 
Hufty, 2011; World Bank, 2014).  
All the formal agreements listed above are forming an international oil and gas management 
regime in the Barents Sea Region, where Norway and Russia as states, together with the 
corporations of these two countries, are major actors. The legal setting of Norwegian–Russian 
cooperation is embedded primarily in international regulation designed for combating pollution 
at sea. However, there is no overarching international document that would specifically cover 
the standards or address best practices for oil and gas exploration and exploitation activities of 
any kind. Instead, many international rules apply when it comes to pollution at sea. 
At the current stage, this regime has not evolved into an integrated and well-structured system; 
the order has not been completed yet. Moreover, full-scale all-around operations have not yet 
begun. As for now, offshore projects are few and far between.  Norwegian Snøhvit and Goliat 
and Russian Prirazlomnoye are located within national EEZs and far away from the border. 
Nevertheless, all the formal agreements on international, regional, bilateral and b2b levels 
discussed above constitute a regulatory patchwork. For the purpose of this paper, I define it as a 
patchwork regime, with reference to Kobrin, Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, who described 
‘patchwork’ as interdependent and entangled political structures, with blurred boundaries of 
responsibilities. “Actors converge across fluid boundaries in the ways they structure themselves, 
connect with the others and pursue their interests” (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006). I interpret 
the patchwork regulatory regime as a fragmentated system consisting of separate bits and pieces 
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of arrangements, but at the same time they represent a multilevel governance structure, as seen 
in Figure 1. 
 
Fig.1. A patchwork regulatory regime. 1-international level; 2-regional level; 3-bilateral level; 4-
business level. 
Why do Norway and Russia choose to cooperate in the first place? The states cooperate because 
of their geographical proximity and shared functional dependency.  First of all, the Barents Sea 
contains a number of trans-border hydrocarbon deposits such as Fedynsky High. The 
development of such a project requires agreement not only between the states but also between 
the companies on how exactly to run the production in terms of investment, product and profit 
sharing. Secondly, geographical proximity implies the possibility of trans-border contamination 
in the case of a contingent event, such as an oil spill, which would have an effect on the whole 
regional ecosystem, including joint fish stocks. 
If we take a broader perspective and look into the history of the oil and gas industry in both 
countries, we can see that, without expertise and capital from abroad, Norwegian oil and gas 
development would not have started. It was American ConocoPhilips that discovered Ekofisk field 
in 1969; furthermore, foreign oil companies held a dominant position on the Norwegian 
continental shelf NCS for a long time. In the case of Russia, partnerships with international 
companies allowed them to revive the declining production rates throughout the 1990s and early 
2000s. Arctic oil and gas development is capital-intensive; it also requires state-of-the-art 
technology. In the case of the Barents Sea region, it is logical to expect that Russian companies 
with little offshore expertise would be interested in joining efforts with Norwegian companies, 
because the history of Norwegian oil and gas is all about offshore development. At the same 
time, Norwegian companies entering the Russian market gain access to a resource base and the 
possibility of powering the national budget with petroleum income for decades, because 
hydrocarbon reserves in Norway are declining. 
The oil and gas industry is capital-intensive and dominated by powerful companies that operate 
on a global scale. Investments are long-term, and they require substantial infrastructure and 
predictable framework conditions. Cooperation agreements, designed for both future joint 
production activities and emergency response, create a legal field, within which national 
companies can maximize gains and reduce costs. International agreements improve the 
institutional environment for companies’ operation in the region by reducing the risks of 
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petroleum operations to an acceptable level before the operations actually start. They allow the 
advancement of environmental safety and risk mitigation to be facilitated by preparing 
infrastructure to combat the accidents. The effectiveness of such a patchwork regime model is 
yet to be examined.  
Offshore development in the Barents Sea region is an issue area “bridging the global and the local 
and taking place at the same time within, between and across national boundaries” (Djelic & 
Sahlin-Andersson, 2006). Hydrocarbon development in the Barents region is influenced by 
external pressures, such as price volatility, geopolitical instability, climate considerations and 
internal pressures, for example favourable tax regimes, environmental regulations, etc. At the 
international level, oil and gas activities in the Barents Sea waters stir activities in other parts of 
the Arctic. At the local level, even the potential of future activities evokes a conflict between 
different stakeholders, in terms of environmental impact and economic sustainability in the long 
term. In Russia and Norway, extractive industries are the biggest taxpayers; they contribute the 
lion’s share of national budgets and generate the largest portion of GDP. Hydrocarbon 
development is very important to the national economies, but it can undermine the economies 
of the northern communities that are not adequately represented in the decision-making process 
and are commonly left with harsh environmental impacts.  
What does this regime analysis mean in terms of governance theory? Regime theory offers a 
narrower perspective on the current developments than governance theory (Stokke, 1997). 
Regime theory focuses on the arrangements that have been made at the international level and, 
therefore, the main actors in this context are those that operate internationally. The regime 
analysis focuses primarily on the legislative side of the issue area and pays little attention to 
domestic discourses and internal drivers behind national foreign policies (Haufer, 1993 in Stokke, 
1997). Furthermore, the discussion on cross-sectoral interaction is unrepresented, as regime 
theory detaches each issue area from the political agenda canvas, while, from the governance 
perspective, the borders between the issue areas are blurred and “often transcended by various 
actors, ideas and mediating norms” (Stokke, 1997). For example, the development of offshore 
hydrocarbons is impossible without established jurisdictional boundaries regarding the seabed. 
It may facilitate commercial shipping and at the same time negatively influence industrial fishing 
and tourism.  
Governance theory allows similar questions to be asked from a broader perspective. In the wake 
of new geopolitical crises, the joint fisheries regime in the Barents Sea can be regarded as a role 
model, not only for joint resource management but also of cooperation between Russia and 
Western countries.  In this respect, if  we return to the discussion on effectiveness, Haas and 
Rothwell stated that the effectiveness of the international regime implies the “ability to enforce 
or impose its decisions upon the members and at the same time obtain a degree of acceptance 
from those who are outside of the region” (Haas, 1983; Rothwell, 1996) So, it becomes possible 
to shift the research focus from the agreed standards of behaviour, studied by regime theory, to 
the process of re-establishing cooperation, studied by means of governance theory.  
 
Conclusion 
Offshore hydrocarbon development in the Barents Sea is in its infancy; nevertheless, it is a 
dynamic process. Today’s focus area for joint Norwegian–Russian projects has shifted from the 
Russian sector of the Barents Sea to the Norwegian sector. Local regional processes are 
interconnected with global political and economic trends, for example: market forces and energy 
demand, climate considerations, national foreign policies, corporate interest and technological 
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solutions. On the other hand, under the pressure of new developments in international relations, 
the prospects of the oil and gas industry in the Barents Sea will change again in the not-so-distant 
future. Global oil prices have stabilized and OPEC10 is ready to slow down production. After the 
election of Trump as the new American president and the appointment of Tillerson, the Exxon 
CEO, as secretary of state, the sanction policy against the Russian oil and gas industry is very likely 
to shift. Development of offshore natural gas is interpreted by the energy majors in line with the 
Paris agreement, as this type of fossil fuel is the most energy-effective in terms of carbon dioxide 
emissions.  
The internal factors in relation to proceeding with oil and gas development in the Barents Sea, 
such as economic dependence on hydrocarbon exports and maturing brownfields, have not 
changed over the last few years. Therefore, the rationale for bilateral cooperation will remain in 
place. What will this mean for the patchwork model of regime? It will continue to extend with 
new agreements on different levels as the new oil and gas development prospects will come into 
picture. In addition, its development will indicate general improvements in East–West relations 
and contribute to predictability of political actorsin the region. 
 The next step will be to research the effectiveness of such a patchwork model in general and 
cooperation arrangements in particular. That will be possible once the joint development begins 
in the form of a joint venture operating within EEZ or in a form of trans-border field development.  
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SCENARIO METHOD AS AN APPROACH TO COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
Jon Skinner 
 
Overview 
This paper seeks to capture the contribution of the coursework and scenario exercise (Bodø 23-
26 May, 2016) to the researcher’s own dissertation effort, “Russian capacity to develop its 
offshore hydrocarbon reserves in the Kara Sea: Arctic and global implications”. The theme of that 
research is a comprehensive interdisciplinary assessment of the hydrocarbon extractive 
enterprise in the Kara Sea to gain insight into a future Russia’s relative strategic stability and 
capacity to make unilateral foreign policy choices.  The basic premise is that Russia’s 
development of its Arctic natural resources, particularly hydrocarbons, is central to its overall 
geopolitical strategy and is candidly declared so in its strategic Arctic policy.  An identified 
declared risk and threat to that strategy is a: “…lack of modern technical means and technologies 
for exploration and development of offshore hydrocarbon fields in the Arctic” (Strategic 
Development, 2013, p. 2).   Further, the Kara Sea is emphasized because of the magnitude of its 
estimated hydrocarbon reserves, particularly of oil (Piskarev and Shkatov, 2012), and its 
consequent potential to impact the long-term progression or regression of the Russian economy, 
thereby influencing future central government interactions with the global community.  This 
paper is divided into two sections: the first, for context, a discussion of the researchers own 
dissertation; the second, a discussion of scenario development methods with reference to 
DR437E course materials, including a description of the scenario exercise in Bodø and the 
researcher’s Kara Sea scenario outcomes. 
 
Research approach, tools and methods 
The dissertation’s objective was to first identify the key drivers impacting hydrocarbon extraction 
in the Kara Sea.  Some of these were policy driven, e.g. Russian strategic goals: some climatic and 
others market based, such as the fluctuating demand and price of oil.  These drivers were then 
analysed to isolate and assess the most critical and uncertain for the future development of the 
Arctic offshore in general and, when possible, the Kara Sea specifically. The last step was to 
experiment with how these drivers, or variables, might interact within a complex system by the 
creation of plausible future scenarios.   In preparation, interdisciplinary research tools from 
international relations theory and energy economics, as well as incorporated historical, 
environmental science, geographic area studies, and technical reports from the oil and gas 
industry were utilized.  Primary research incorporated three qualitative methods: a survey of 
experts, a workshop and a scenario-development process (it was to the latter, scenario 
development, that DR437E proved a useful contribution).   Lastly, from the researcher’s 
pragmatic worldview perspective or bias (Creswell, 2014), an already complex analysis would 
have become impenetrable by the addition of philosophical, normative or ideological policy 
questions, the most potent and obvious being: Is a strong Russia good, or bad?   
 
Qualitative methods 
The overall research approach was qualitative for a holistic interdisciplinary study (Creswell, 
2014).   A geographically delimited intensive research design was used to ground, isolate and 
enrich the detail of the data (Clifford et al., 2010) but not to arbitrarily limit the research, as most 
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of the key drivers ranged across political and geographical borders.  Rather, the intent was to 
enrich a regional backdrop for the employment of the study’s research tools.  Although data 
collection was as detailed as could be plausibly incorporated into analysis, early in the effort a 
judgement was made to approach the research questions with a top-down approach.  A 
mechanical bottom-up manipulation of the data, driven by an incremental economics model, or 
assessing and quantifying—even with the most rudimentary simplistic method—only the 
economic variables, such as future rents and revenues, cash flows, hydrocarbon market pricing 
and the influences of supply and demand, just could not be proven with scientific methods.  A 
judgement was also made that it would not be achievable to develop realistic probabilities (Scott, 
2014).  The applicability of qualitative scenario methods for the research objectives is supported 
by Swart, Raskin and Robinson: “The distinction between quantitative (modeling) and qualitative 
(narrative) should be underscored…Quantitative modeling is…appropriate for simulating well-
understood systems over sufficiently short times…as complexity increases and the time horizon 
of interest lengthens, the power of prediction diminishes” (Swart et al., 2004, p. 140).    
 
Complexity 
Key drivers or variables that impact hydrocarbon development—global and regional energy 
markets, climate change effects and technological advancement—interact in a complex 
framework at varying speeds and in a non-linear manner.  The same is true of the effectiveness 
and influence of strategic policy, regional governance and the other social-political variables, as 
well as those specific to the Kara Sea region.  Analysis of how key drivers might interact within 
scenarios for hydrocarbon extraction still has to embrace the challenge of different timescales 
for the multiple drivers of the future.  –theory was deemed useful as a means to ground this 
interplay, taking into special account the capacity for shared learning and change overtime, 
especially with social-political drivers (Levin et al., 2012, p. 12).  Complex adaptive systems have 
strong roots in archaeology, where rules of the natural sciences do not always bind research 
parameters, as information is shared within the data set and direct modifications must be 
accounted for (Barton, 2013.  Even the simplest human societies and their components are 
complex because of this relatively rapid adaptability and the capacity to share and learn.   
 
Scenario method 
The scenario method approach, largely relied upon in the author’s own dissertation work, is most 
closely associated with Peter Schwartz’s methods, developed while at Royal Dutch Shell and 
Global Business Network (GBN) (Schwartz, 1991).  A fundamental of that approach is that there 
is no intent to predict or determine the probability of future events.  The objective is to identify 
the variables, usually termed drivers, and assess how they might interact within a complex 
system to produce plausible outcomes or narratives. Scenario futures are not attempts to 
forecast or predict linear projections into the future.  Rather, they are used to best prepare future 
decision-makers for uncertainties.  Kees van der Heijden, who has often partnered with Schwartz, 
further characterizes this process: “A scenario’s focus on developing and differentiating drivers 
and how they are interconnected in a complex system, will produce structurally different futures 
…conceived through a process of causal rather than probabilistic thinking (Van der Heijden, 2005, 
p. 27).”  This approach has strong roots in industry, particularly oil and gas, but has also been 
applied in government.   
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Origin of the scenario method 
The scenario method has strong roots in strategic planning and in the O&G industry specifically.  
Very useful and worthy of special mention was DR437E’s assigned reading of Amer, Tugrul, Daim 
and Jetter’s, A Review of Scenario Planning, which provided a very thorough theoretical 
framework and comprehensive overview of the history of scenario-planning and its quantitative 
and qualitative theoretical schools (Amer et al., 2103).  The reference list accompanying this 
article provided at least three more excellent sources utilized for both this paper and the relevant 
dissertation chapter.  Scenarios’ narratives use storyboards, much like a novel or a screenplay, 
but the intent is to construct plausible narrative futures to enrich future decision making, not to 
simply entertain or build a timeline for the captivating or sensational.  Rare events can and do 
have great impact, but b definition they are also improbable within the time frame of effective 
human decision.  These rare but impactful possibilities termed ‘wild cards’ or, if especially 
cataclysmic, ‘black swan’ events, are identified in the process but kept aside and not incorporated 
into the analysis.  Highly improbable but impactful astronomical events and strategic nuclear war, 
for example, would both usually fall into this category.  A philosophical foundation for coping 
with these rare but dramatic potentials in the future, as well as the impossibility of predicting 
them, is provided by Nassim Taleb: 
The Black Swan is about consequential epistemic limitations, both psychological  (hubris 
and biases) and philosophical (mathematical) limits to knowledge, both individual and collective.  
I say “consequential” because the focus is on impactful  rare events, as our  knowledge, 
both empirical and theoretical, breaks down with those—the more remote the  events, the less 
we can forecast them, yet they are the most impactful. (Taleb, 2010, p. 330) 
This “intuitive” approach to scenarios was also used by Herman Kahn and the Rand Corporation 
as early as the 1960s (Amer et al., 2013).  No mathematical algorithms are utilized and the focus 
is on identifying causal processes, decision points to improve decision-making processes.  While 
at Royal Dutch Shell, Pierre Wack contributed to “adaptive” scenario-planning, by leading the 
1972 process that developed a set of plausible “stories” envisioning an interruption in global oil 
supplies.  This corporate scenario work gave Shell a leg up among their peers in reacting to the 
1973 Arab oil embargo and its related dramatic pressures on market supply (Amer et al., 2013).  
If, in the future, a forensic re-assessment proved available for looking back and scoring a scenario 
project, it would not be the eventual actual outcomes themselves of scenario narratives that 
validate their value, but how they assisted decision makers in best preparing for necessary 
decisions along the way.  This approach has strong roots in industry, particularly in oil and gas, 
but has also been applied in government.  Most notably it was used as a tool for “transformative 
planning” in early post-apartheid South Africa, in what are known as the Mont Fleur series of 
scenario exercises; but it has also been employed by Singapore’s Ministry of Defence and in the 
US, in areas such as the 2000 report of the Commission on National Security/21st Century 
(Kahane, 2012; Wilkinson and Kupers, 2014).  
 
Quantitative and mixed method scenarios 
The scenario method described above and adopted for the researcher’s dissertation is 
fundamentally qualitative and intuitive.  But there are other noteworthy schools of scenario 
development that are better suited to narrower research questions in shorter time frames.  
These include the “probabilistic modified trends” methodology, which uses the matrix based 
tools of “trend impact analysis” and “cross impact analysis”.  Another is the “prospective 
thinking” or French School model, which does not presuppose that the future is predetermined 
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by its drivers but, rather, can be modified and shaped (Amer et al., 2013).  Quantitative 
methodologies are more generally applied to public or infrastructure development policies and 
planning, e.g. Carl Steinitz and his use of a wide range of sources and stakeholder perspectives 
to develop scenarios for use in landscape and public resource planning (Steinitz et al., 2002).  
Mixed methodologies have also found a place in Royal Dutch Shell’s own studies to enrich with 
statistical models the qualitative method they themselves pioneered to assess topical futures as 
diverse as climate change, biodiversity, demography, migrations and transforming states (Shell, 
2005). 
 
Overview and preparation for the Bodø scenario exercise 
As part of a group exercise, this writer led a group of international graduate students through a 
scripted scenario-development process and competition.  The topic and criteria were provided, 
as well as the organization of the participating groups themselves.  In scenario-construction, 
there are multiple opinions as to how many narratives are most useful.  In opening first day 
presentations of the course, both Indra Øverland and Anatoli Bourmistrov discussed a three-
scenario process to be utilized by course participants, similar to the one used in their contribution 
to their recent book (Øverland et al., 2015).  The table of  assumptions was also held in common 
for all three scenarios in their methodology.  A separate matrix was developed to identify 
uncertainties which varied in their influence on the three alternative narratives.  This approach 
was somewhat different from the method employed by GBN, which focuses on “key drivers” that 
play out within four quadrants framed by “critical uncertainties”, which was the method 
employed by this researcher to create four dissertation scenarios for Kara Sea futures.   The GBN 
method was used by our group (Group 4) for scenario-building, although portions of the Øverland 
and Bourmistrov method were incorporated as well, such as the “fingerprint diagram”.  Both the 
GBN and “Øverland” methods require the identification of “wild cards”.  These are deemed to be 
events that could dramatically impact the future but are also of low probability.  Generally “wild 
cards”, although identified, are excluded from narrative construction as they are unlikely to assist 
the future decision-making process.   
 
The High North: framing aquaculture future scenarios 2030 
The first step utilized by Group 4 to build our scenarios was to identify all the different kinds of 
drivers (assumptions, critical uncertainties and wild cards) that could contribute to the future 
High North world.  Once compiled, we then assessed and classified the different drivers between 
assumptions, critical uncertainties and wild cards.  By means of a vote, we selected two of what 
we considered the most important critical uncertainties that would determine the future 
development of the High North by 2030.  This was essentially the GBN method.  Each member of 
the group could select up to two.  Hydrocarbon extraction and international cooperation were 
thus selected by vote as framing uncertainties (both axes from a high to low endpoint scale).  The 
remaining unselected uncertainties dropped down to be included in discussion simply as other 
drivers/assumptions. We then crossed these two axes to frame four quadrants to sketch 
plausible scenarios, as depicted by the following (Figure 1).  
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Figure 2 1 High North: aquaculture future scenarios to 2030 
 
In the next step we fleshed out and entitled/named three scenarios (the fourth was eliminated 
due to an external course directive) by ranking the remaining drivers for each quadrant as high, 
medium or low for each scenario—framed by the two most critical uncertainties.  When not 
unanimous, the group voted to determine this ranking.  Quadrant III, or the potential scenario 
framed by low hydrocarbon demand and low international cooperation, was not developed as it 
most reflected current conditions and, thus, would be least valuable as a tool—it could simply be 
“forecasted from the present in linear fashion. 
 
Identifying drivers and critical uncertainties 
One of the bigger drivers we had in mind for these scenarios was the Northern Sea Route (NSR). 
This Arctic shipping route transits the Barents Sea to the Pacific Ocean.  As of today, this route is 
free of ice for only two months of the year, but, if this time frame expands, it will be interesting 
to see how it will affect the area. However, we believed that the global environment would not 
change enough within a 15-year time frame to have crtical impact.  
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The scenarios 
Let’s get rich together! (High cooperation and high extraction) The High North is flourishing; 
the development in the area has seen a tremendous level of cooperation and investment. In 
the 15 years that have passed since 2016, the area has changed in ways that could not be 
foreseen. Once preliminary drilling for hydrocarbons started, the industrialization of the area 
boomed, although by 2030 most of the projects had yet to enter the energy market at full 
production levels due to the timelines needed for these complex projects.  
Serve yourself! (Low cooperation and high extraction) Cold War version 2.0 was rebooted in 
the High North. It is often said that money is the root of all evil, and that proved to be the case 
in this scenario. All the Arctic countries decided to explore in the High North, but they never 
found common ground. World War Three did not break out, but global relations reached a low. 
Russia and the USA once again moved towards an arms race, impacting the whole globe. What 
else could have happened in a world with an oil price of over 250$/bbl and little to no global 
friendship?  Russia was again out of money.  All nations across the globe began focusing much 
more on their own issues and their own businesses. Cooperating with other countries became a 
low priority. 
All you need is love! (High cooperation, low extraction) The world is growing bigger; we have 
seen a major rise in population all over the world, and this has contributed to the exploration of 
the High North. The hydrocarbon reserves in these areas were not at all as forecasted; some 
drilling was conducted, but only a few viable hydrocarbon reserves were found.  The area has 
been preserved to a very large extent when it comes to natural habitat, and the indigenous 
peoples of the different Arctic regions have largely been left alone.  
This is where we started from: Not developed due to exercise instructions.  Note: This 
quadrant is essentially where we judged that we are at present. 
 
Wild cards 
Within this assignment, we identified the “wild cards”: those drivers that have a very low 
probability of happening but if they were to occur would have a devastating effect.  The general 
norm is to exclude these low-probability high-impact events.  The wild cards we defined included: 
• Massive oil spill: Whenever there is hydrocarbon-extraction there is the risk of a spill, and if 
this spill is big, the consequences will be major. The famous BP oil-spill Deepwater Horizon 
shows us this.  
• World war: Although this is very unlikely as of today, the prospects of a very devastating 
world war would absolutely destroy the possibilities for developing the Arctic (or any other 
area for that matter).  
• Change in global currents: Our Earth consists mainly of water, water that flows with 
currents and winds. The Gulf Stream, for example, affects both the eastern parts of the 
USA and the western parts of Europe, and it is generally accepted that this stream has 
contributed to the affected parts of the world being warmer than otherwise. If these 
currents were to suddenly change, as was feared not that long ago, it would impact the 
climate in the High North quite dramatically. 
• Atmospheric disaster: There are many dormant volcanoes around the world; if one of these 
suddenly erupted, we would potentially face a global change in climate. If this kind of 
eruption happened on a large scale, this would have sudden, global and devastating 
effects, and developing in the High North would probably be last on our list of priorities. 
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Exercise concluding thoughts 
In conclusion, the course workshop provided a good opportunity to apply the tools in scenario 
design that might best fit the desired objective. It was not constrained by theory but, rather, 
allowed the use of the methodological tools that best fit that objective. 
 
Kara Sea outcomes 
For comparative purposes, the four scenarios derived for this researcher’s dissertation are 
provided in the following Figure 2.  This framing also used the GBN method. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Scenarios on Kara Sea offshore hydrocarbon development 
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ARCTIC SHIPPING ACTIVITIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR LOCAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM 
Julia Olsen 
 
Abstract 
This paper is the final assignment of a PhD course in “Governance in the High North: Implications 
for Arctic Private and Public Sector”. It starts with a presentation of the problem statement, the 
existing and missing knowledge and the choice of theoretical approach to address the problem 
statement. In the background, I present the existing knowledge on the complexity of relations 
between three main variables that are used in this work: multiple stressors in the Arctic, 
increasing shipping activities and local communities. Given the socio-economic heterogeneity of 
the Arctic region, I choose two cases (two port communities: one in Russia, one in Norway) in 
order to understand those connections. Two theoretical approaches (adaptive capacity and 
governance) will help unpack those relations. Then, I will provide some reflections on how co-
management as a governance approach can be applied in this work; and discuss the importance 
of “cross-Arctic” governance arrangements. Since I am at the beginning of my PhD project, I will 
not provide any preliminary results but, rather, argue for the choice of the theoretical approach 
and its limitations.  
 
Introduction 
The Arctic is facing multiple and rapid changes in socio-economic and environmental conditions 
(e.g. ACIA, 2005; Arctic Council, 2013). The interaction of those changes will have cascading 
effects on the well-being of indigenous and non-indigenous communities and will challenge local 
adaptive capacity (West and Hovelsrud, 2010). Increasing shipping activities in the Arctic are a 
result of changes in climatic and market conditions and, at the same time, a contributor to the 
changes in local communities (PAME, 2009).  
A limited number of studies indicate that this development will have both positive and negative 
impacts on the adaptive capacity of local coastal communities that are already experiencing a 
number of changes in their social, political, economic and environmental systems (i.e.  Meier et 
al., 2014; Davydov and Mikhailova, 2011). The studies from the Canadian Arctic indicate that this 
development is perceived as both an additional stressor and a source of new opportunities for 
community development (e.g. Stewart et al., 2015; Dawson et al., 2016). The same studies stress 
the importance of detailed understanding of the impact of Arctic shipping on the coastal 
communities and their adaptive capacity.  
Given the rate and the amplitude of change in the Arctic, shipping development will require an 
appropriate governance system in order to increase the benefits, mitigate the negative impact 
from shipping activities for local communities and strengthen local adaptive capacity (Dawson et 
al., 2014). By applying a co-management approach, I will test the assumption made by scholars 
that the degree of local community participation in the decision-making process has a direct 
impact on local adaptive capacity (i.e. Keskitalo et al., 2011). 
Thus, the main objective of this work is to assess the governance of shipping activities in the 
Arctic and to understand how co-management as a governance approach can contribute to 
mitigating the risks and strengthening local adaptive capacity. I will refer to the course literature 
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and lectures in order to understand the governance of the shipping activities in the Arctic region 
from the perspective of local communities. One of the many ideas to which we were introduced 
on the course is the interconnection of different variables and the process in the Arctic (i.e. 
Young, 2010). Thus, in this work, shipping development is discussed in the context of those 
factors or main drivers.  
Then, particular focus will be given to the role of local communities’ engagement and 
participation in the decision-making. Later, I will discuss whether the concept of co-management 
can be applied as a possible governance approach for local community adaptation to a number 
of stressors in the Arctic, including increasing shipping activities.  
With the help of Fig. 1, I will describe the structure of this paper, such as the state of knowledge, 
data gaps and the theoretical concepts for the research topic. The figure illustrates four 
connections of three main research elements: multiple stressors, shipping activities and local 
communities.  
Firstly, I will start my analysis by mapping out the links between multiple stressors and local 
communities (1a) and between multiple stressors and shipping (1b). I will use an existing body of 
literature to guide my work and help me understand those connections. Secondly, I will look 
closely at link number two between shipping and local communities (2). There is a lack of 
scientific literature describing these connections, but some studies indicate that increased 
shipping activities in the Arctic bring both challenges and opportunities to the local communities. 
The third connection is an assumption that shipping activities have implications for the adaptive 
capacity and governance system of local communities. This will provide a basis for discussion.  
  
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1. Research plan. 
  
Background 
Multiple stressors and local communities (Link 1a) 
Climate change is one of the concerns currently facing Arctic communities (ACIA, 2005). The 
Arctic is warming much faster than the rest of the globe (IPCC, 2013; ACIA, 2005; Porfiriev, 2008; 
Roshydromet, 2011; Tsalikov, 2009; Vorobiev et al., 2011), with higher expected temperatures, 
Multiple stressors 
Shipping 
Local communities 
1b 
1a 
2 
3 
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precipitation and storm activities (IPCC, 2013). The changes in the environment caused by climate 
change are felt first by communities whose livelihoods are connected to the nature (AMAP, 2011, 
pp. 10-18). A finding from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) underlines that 
changes in the environment have cascading effects on Arctic communities (IPCC, 2007). A 
number of studies have found that local communities do not respond to the impact of climate 
change in isolation from other changes in socio-economic and political conditions (e.g., O’Brien 
et al., 2004; Hovelsrud et al., 2010; West and Hovelsrud, 2010).  
In addition to climate change, a number of trends challenging community viability and adaptation 
were identified in the first Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR, 2004): urbanization, 
commercialization, globalization and privatization. This list was expanded in the second report 
(AHDR-II, 2014) with the following trends: global risks, industrialization based on extractive 
industries, the mobility of goods, people, and ideas (TemaNord, 2014, p. 466). Therefore, the 
Arctic region is exposed and sensitive to changes in socio-economic, cultural, political and 
environmental (including climatic) conditions (e.g. Arctic Council, 2013; West and Hovelsrud, 
2010, p. 343). Differences in power relations and the broader political context will influence 
people’s ability to cope with changes across the region (TemaNord, 2014, p. 434). 
 
Shipping activities in the Arctic (Link 1b) 
According to some of the Arctic scenario studies (e.g. Loe et al., 2014; Overland et al., 2015), 
shipping activities in the Arctic will increase and the North East Passage will be used as a transit 
corridor to the global market. Already in 2004 (a snapshot year for the Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment (AMSA) report), about 3000 vessels were operating in the Arctic waters (PAME, 2009, 
p. 72). Since that time, maritime activities in the Arctic Ocean have become more extensive. It is 
impossible to predict the ice conditions and how much of the Arctic will be navigable and for how 
long (Mière and Mazo, 2013, p. 17), but some studies project nearly ice-free summer conditions 
by the mid-21st century (Stephenson et al., 2013). The Arctic Ocean and especially Russian, 
Greenlandic and Norwegian coastal areas are becoming more and more accessible to different 
kind of vessels such as cargo and cruise ships and those involved in exploration, fishing and 
military activities (Vold et al., 2013; Stephenson et al., 2013; Østreng et al., 2013).  
Sea-ice retreat, globalization and the growth of the international market, in addition to increasing 
interest in the Arctic as a tourism destination, are just some of the trends that fuel shipping 
development (Lemelin et al., 2010). In total, approximately 120 factors will affect the future of 
Arctic shipping, among them governance issues, geopolitical factors, socio-economic factors, 
climate change and wild cards (PAME, 2009, p. 93).  
This development will require new infrastructure, better monitoring and weather forecasting, 
the opening of new-side industries, search and rescue facilities, etc. Daily sea-ice variability and 
unpredictable weather conditions, coupled with the Just-In-Time features of the delivery system 
(press for time to deliver), increase the probability of shipping accidents (Farré et al., 2014, p. 5), 
presenting new challenges for local communities and the environment.  
Given the context of dynamic development, the need for improvements in operational conditions 
and a better understanding of the impacts of the shipping activities will require a new type of 
governance to mitigate the possible negative impacts and to secure sustainable socio-economic 
development in the Arctic region. 
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Shipping as a new stressor for local communities (Link 2) 
Certain types of shipping activities “simultaneously contribute to and [are] influenced by wider 
forces of change” (Stewart et al., 2015, p. 403). The impacts of Arctic navigation on local coastal 
communities that are already exposed to climatic, environmental and economic changes is poorly 
discussed in the scientific literature, and there is a lack of information on local community 
involvement in the governance system. 
A limited number of studies identify that shipping activities may have both positive and negative 
impacts on the Arctic coastal indigenous and non-indigenous peoples (e.g. Davydov and 
Mikhailova, 2011, p. 8438; Brattland, 2012; and examples from the Canadian Arctic: Stewart et 
al., 2015; Dawson et al., 2016). See Table 1.  
Table 1. Examples of potential impacts, on areas of heightened cultural significance, from various 
types of vessel traffic in the Arctic (Adopted from AMAP/CAFF/SDWG, 2013). 
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Increased 
shipping 
activity 
Effects Potential negative effects Potential positive effects 
Shipping 
activity in 
general 
Oil spills, waste 
water, rubbish, 
development of 
harbours and 
other infrastructure, 
ice breaker 
activity 
Negative visual effect and 
impact on archaeological 
sites 
Workforce influx resulting in 
demographic and cultural 
change 
Social and health issues 
Change or loss of natural 
resource base 
Loss of traditional 
knowledge 
Improved access to goods 
and 
services, including 
medical 
Economic opportunity 
Cruise 
tourism 
Increased number of 
visitors to heritage 
sites 
Impact on surface, rubbish, 
vandalism, amateur 
surveys and excavations, 
unauthorized memorial 
plaques, etc. 
Employment/income 
opportunities 
Increased awareness 
about 
heritage in the wider 
society 
Stimulus to research and 
financial support 
Increased number of 
boat and helicopter 
landings 
Impact on surface and 
increased erosion 
 
Infrastructure on the 
shore 
Visual impact, site 
destruction 
 
On-site accidents Destruction of sites and 
objects 
 
Use of underwater 
equipment, 
building of platforms, 
pipes, 
ports, etc. 
Direct impact on shoreline 
and submerged sites 
Loss of heritage sites and 
historic properties on land 
Discovery of underwater 
sites 
Funding for cultural 
resource 
surveys 
Bottom trawling Damage to underwater 
heritage and historic 
properties 
 
Shipping 
associated 
with 
prospecting 
and 
exploration 
Building of 
infrastructure 
Direct impact on shoreline 
and underwater sites 
Employment  
Infrastructure 
Fishing 
activity 
Operations Damage to and destruction 
of underwater sites 
Disruption of coastal 
fisheries by large-scale 
fisheries 
New opportunities for 
fishing, selling fish 
Military 
activity 
Operations Restriction on local use  
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Among the potential positive effects noted is the fact that the extension of the navigable season 
brings new economic opportunities to the region in terms of resource development, trade and 
new tourist destinations (Rasmussen, 2011). The increase in various types of vessel traffic and 
the extension of the navigable season open a vital link for goods’ delivery to local communities 
that may reduce costs (AMAP/CAFF/SDWG, 2013).  The increasing cruise-tourism activities may 
benefit Arctic communities through greater awareness of cultural values and heritage (e.g. 
Stewart et al., 2015) and improve employment and income opportunities (AMAP/CAFF/SDWG, 
2013, p. 102). The study from Canada shows that cruise tourism presents a range of opportunities 
such as the showcasing to visitors of Inuit culture and traditions, the sharing of local history, the 
opportunity to meet new people and participate in joint activities and the generation of seasonal 
income for the community (Stewart et al., 2015). 
The example from the Russian Arctic assumes that shipping associated with cruise tourism, 
prospecting and exploration results in the development of Arctic town-ports, transport and 
coastal infrastructure, and search and rescue facilities. In addition, it may, but does not 
necessarily, lead to socio-economic improvements (e.g. Grushenko, 2014; Plisetskiy, 2016; 
Zalyvsky, 2015).  
Despite the positive impacts, increased Arctic shipping activities may create concerns about the 
social, cultural and environmental effects on Arctic coastal residents (AMAP/CAFF/SDWG, 2013, 
p. 101) that maintain many aspects of a traditional way of life (AMAP, 2011, pp. 10-20). For 
coastal indigenous peoples, the marine environment continues to play a central role as a source 
of food, in settlement patterns, as a source of income, and in cultural practices and boundaries 
(AMAP, 2011, pp. 10-2). Remote coastal communities are vulnerable to impacts from increasing 
shipping activities that may harm their natural resources through disturbance and pollution and 
hamper access to such resources. Shipping lanes, especially those for cruise vessels adjacent to 
the village coasts (AMAP/CAFF/SDWG, 2013, p. 101), bring a great number of visitors to small 
coastal communities. This may be a source of revenue but also a challenge (Stewart et al., 2015) 
and may place cultural heritage areas at greater risk (AMAP/CAFF/SDWG, 2013, p. 101). 
Examples from the Canadian Arctic indicate other potential risks associated with cruise tourism, 
such as ship pollution, impact on marine mammals, potential accidents, a lack of local capacity 
to cope with the intensity of visits and lack of port infrastructure (Stewart et al., 2015). 
 
Methodological framework 
In order to assess the governance system, it is necessary to understand the local communities’ 
responses to ongoing changes and to assess whether they are able to adapt to them. I believe 
that the use of an abductive research strategy (bottom-up approach), described by Blaikie (2010), 
helps us to understand the social life, perceptions and response to change of communities. That 
research strategy incorporates “meaning and interpretations, the motives and intention, that 
people use in their everyday lives, and which direct their behavior – and elevates them to the 
central place in social theory and research” (Blaikie, 2010, p. 89).  
 
Data collection 
A case study approach will guide the research methodology of this work. For this work I choose 
two port communities in the European part of the Arctic: one Russian and one Norwegian. The 
main criteria for selection are: (1) shipping development has been a part of the community’s 
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development, (2) port activities have increased over the last two decades, (3) change in climate 
is one of the drivers for development, and (4) the local community is affected by shipping 
development.   
Longyearbyen on Svalbard is a unique—and the world’s northernmost—settlement with a small 
but mobile community of about 2100 people from 40 nations. The town experiences high 
turnover and there are almost no residents over 66 years old. Historically, shipping activities have 
played a significant role in the Archipelago’s development and, since the 1990s, cruise activities 
have increased substantially. Other changes, such as reduced coal production by the local coal 
mining company, Store Norske Spitsbergen Kullkompani, and the growth of other sectors have 
shaped the socio-economic development and community viability in Longyearbyen (Bjørnsen 
and Johansen, 2013; Forskning.no, 2014).   The recently published white paper on Svalbard (St. 
Meld 32) stresses the importance of investment in research and higher education, tourism and 
other businesses in order to facilitate Longyearbyen as a viable family community (St. Meld, 
2015-2016; Regjeringen.no, 2015). Thus, shipping activities associated with tourism, cargo, 
search and rescue, research and fishing activities (Misund et al., 2016) may continue to grow in 
the coming years (Jørgensen-Dahl and Wergeland, 2013). 
Arkhangelsk is usually called the gateway to Arctic Russia, due to its geographical location in the 
mouth of Dvina River. During the Soviet period, the main economic income came from the timber 
trade, the paper industry and the commercial and fishing port. During recent years, Arkhangelsk 
has become an attractive tourism and education destination. The recent change in port visa 
regulation allows international visitors to experience the city for 72 hours without extra visa 
requirements. Now, according to one local resident, the city is trying to find its ‘new face’, in 
which shipping, including cruise activities, may have a great share. Arkhangelsk is one of the 
dominant ports along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) with a well-developed infrastructure.   
The unit of analysis in this case will be a community (Pomor village), which is located in the delta 
of the river. The criteria for choosing the village will be its tourism attractiveness based on the 
history of Pomor and its location as one of the neighbours to Arkhangelsk Island, which means it 
may experience the impact of increasing shipping activities.  
I use secondary data for this paper. This includes a scientific literature and media review. 
Secondary data collection and analysis help me to develop a baseline and a general 
understanding of how shipping affects the local community’s well-being/adaptive capacity.  
 
Theoretical and conceptual framework (Link 3) 
Adaptation and adaptive capacity  
Multiple stressors in the Arctic, including climate change, pose both challenges and opportunities 
for socio-economic development. It is likely that local Arctic communities will bear the costs of 
these opportunities such as impacts from exploration and shipping activities, infrastructure 
building, and oil and gas activities. Even though some studies (e.g. Forbes et al., 2009) argue that 
the Arctic’s social-ecological system is highly resilient, a number of on-going changes and 
interests (i.e. commercial, political, economic, legal, conservation) can create new challenges for 
adaptation (Plummer and Baird, 2013) and flexibility in coping with climatic variability (ACIA, 
2005, p. 665).  
In this work, we will use the analytical concept of adaptation and adaptive capacity to analyse 
the community responses to multiple changes.  Adaptation has been described by many scholars 
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and is applied to general societal change, specifically to address climate change (Amundsen, 
2012, p. 47). Smit and Pilifosova (2001) define adaptation as “adjustment in ecological, social, or 
economic systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli and their effects or impacts” 
(Smit and Pilifosova, 2001, p. 881). The broadly used definition of adaptation does not consider 
the impacts of multiple stressors.  However, as was described in the background, local 
communities do not respond to the impact of climate change in isolation from other changes or 
ongoing processes (O’Brien et al., 2004; West and Hovelsrud, 2010). Here adaptation is applied 
as the process of adjustment to the past, present and future climate and its consequences, in 
combination with societal changes (IPCC, 2007; West and Hovelsrud, 2010; Amundsen, 2012). I 
analyse and approach adaptation to multiple factors; in most cases, it is not climate change that 
is the main challenge to communities and sectors. Climate perturbations interact with socio-
economic challenges, to which society responds. Climate change impacts may also exacerbate 
current challenges in society. Adaptation can be divided into reactive and proactive, or planned, 
measures to reduce the negative effects and impacts or to take advantage of positive 
consequences.    
The analytical concept of adaptation may also help us to identify the local adaptation strategies 
to multiple stressors and to analyse their integration in the governance system. As the AMAP 
report (2011) states, “If proper adaptive guidelines and regulations that anticipate further 
climate scenarios are not in place for industrial development and resource use, then local 
communities become more vulnerable” (AMAP, 2011, pp. 10-18). The International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) has drafted an international framework for navigators operating in the polar 
waters (Polar Code). The Polar Code sets standards for safety and reporting (Brigham, 2014) and 
thus may serve as a form of proactive adaptation (AMAP, 2011, pp. 10-18). 
While adaptation refers to social adjustment to change (Kofinas et al., 2013), the adaptive 
capacity is an individual’s or the community’s ability to cope with, adjust to or recover from 
particular changing conditions (Smit et al., 2010). The capacity to adapt to climate and other 
changes varies between communities and depends on subjective and objective dimensions, 
suggested by Wolf et al. (2013). The subjective dimensions include perceived risk and feasibility 
and self-efficacy, while objective dimensions present determinants/sources of adaptive capacity.  
 
Keskitalo et al. (2011, p. 580) recently summarized those sources or determinants of adaptive 
capacity (adopted from Smit and Pilifosova, 2001): economic resources, access to technology, 
information and skills, infrastructure, social institutions and management capacities, equity, 
flexibility and governance. Governance will differ between nations and may “serve to limit the 
vulnerability of particular sectors and communities to market mechanisms or encourage 
participation of different stakeholder groups in decisions over natural resource management and 
regulations” (Eakin and Lemos, 2006 in Keskitalo et al., 2011). 
Systematic analysis of adaptive capacity determinants is useful for aiding and comparing how the 
case study communities adapt to changes posed by multiple stressors (Keskitalo et al., 2011, p. 
579). Keskitalo et al. (2011) conclude that the determinants of adaptive capacity may result in 
both the development of and limits to local adaption (Keskitalo et al., 2011, p. 580). The 
availability of resources does not guarantee that they are equally distributed within the society, 
making certain community groups more vulnerable (Keskitalo et al., 2011, p. 589). 
An example from the Canadian Arctic stresses the need for appropriate adaptation and 
management strategies that allow local communities to benefit from climate-induced 
development (Dawson et al., 2016). In the same paper, the authors describe the use of the 
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bottom-up approach for engaging local stakeholders in the development of adaptation strategies 
in order to address a concern: “We are promoting economic development in Canada, but we are 
not prepared for its consequences” (Dawson et al., 2016 p. 14). 
 
Governance in the Arctic context 
The term ‘governance’ is defined in a number of ways and has different meanings in the scientific 
literature (e.g. Stoker, 1998). Governance, according to Stoker (1998), refers to “the 
development of governing styles in which boundaries between and within public and private 
have become blurred” in order to achieve common goals. Some aspects of Arctic governance 
(adopted from Stoker’s propositions) should be considered before talking about the Arctic 
shipping governance. 
Firstly, given the dynamics and the amplitude of change in geopolitical, economic, social and 
environmental systems in the Arctic region, no single actor alone can respond to those changes 
or govern the course of action. However, the rapid development in the Arctic governance system 
raises questions about the legitimacy of stakeholders (Young, 2010), especially when new 
stakeholders enter the Arctic or have an impact on the development process.  
Secondly, according to Young (2010), the processes occurring in the Arctic are interrelated and 
have strong connections to the global system. This will challenge the traditional governance 
mechanisms and arrangements and will require new forms of governance in order to maintain 
sustainable development in the region (Young, 2010). This may result in a responsibility shift 
between the actors and the blurring of boundaries between the private and public sectors. 
However, it is still unclear as to who takes responsibility “when things go wrong” (Stoker, 1998). 
Thirdly, the interconnection and interdependency of actors in the governance system makes it 
impossible for one actor to command or deal with the problem or challenge. However, one 
organization may dominate a certain process (Stoker, 1998).  
 
Discussion: Co-management as an approach for local shipping governance 
The governance of Arctic shipping is a “complicated mosaic” (PAME, 2009) of a set of global, 
regional, national and local conventions, laws and regulations (Dawson et al., 2014).  
Global maritime governance is facilitated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and 
formed by four main conventions (Dawson et al., 2014; Pashkevich et al., 2015): 
1. The International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), which presents standards 
for the construction, equipment and operation of ships. 
2. The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). 
3. The Convention on Standards of Training of Seafarers (STCW). 
4. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
National governance is a very complex and dynamic system and varies among the Arctic nations 
(i.e. Pashkevich et al., 2015). In the Russian context, the number of institutions included in cruise 
tourism alone is around 30 and continues to increase (Pashkevich et al., 2015). Some studies 
indicate that this slows down the decision process (Aleksandrov, 2012). According to Plisetskiy 
(2016), the establishment of a single governing body for the strategic management of Russian 
shipping activities is among the priorities for the development of the Northern Sea Route. 
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The studies from the Canadian Arctic indicate a need for a more appropriate management regime 
for different types of Arctic maritime shipping, especially for the rapidly growing cruise industry, 
which represents an increasing proportion of ship traffic (Dawson et al., 2016). As is argued by 
Dawson et al. (2016), “The region [Canadian Arctic] is struggling to keep pace with recent growth 
and to effectively manage industry development”. 
Local shipping governance includes a number of local- and port-lever institutions and permitting 
process. In addition, a number of services and industries such as search and rescue (Arctic 
Council, 2011), communication and port infrastructure play an important role in Arctic 
navigation.  In some cases, local governance system follows the top-down model, which, to a 
certain extent, limits local communities’ involvement. However, the inclusion and engagement 
of local actors may be a crucial element, since the impact of shipping activities is usually felt at 
the local level, and the local actor has valuable knowledge of local conditions that may be 
important in the decision-making process and for safe navigation.  
In addition to the described governance levels, the recent emphasis on navigation in the Polar 
areas has resulted in the establishment of so-called Polar (in our case, Arctic) shipping 
governance: represented by a set of frameworks, institutions, guidelines, etc.  
Safe navigation in the vulnerable Arctic ecosystem is a crucial component in the development. It 
relies on well-developed standards in respect of health, safety and environment (Vold et al., 
2013, p. 7), land-based infrastructure, including search-and-rescue facilities, the availability of 
reliable maps and charts, traffic control, communication capacity, and further developed 
weather forecasting (Farré et al., 2014, p. 16; PAME, 2009, p. 133). 
Those elements are recognized in the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which is a main 
institution for international shipping governance. This agency has drafted the Polar Code, an 
international framework for navigators operating in polar waters (IMO, 2015). The Polar Code 
presents a set of mandatory safety and environmental protection regulations and “covers the full 
range of design, construction, equipment, operational, training, search and rescue and 
environmental protection matters relevant to ships operating in the inhospitable waters 
surrounding the two poles” (IMO, 2015). The ratification of a mandatory Polar Code is expected 
by 2017. The recently adopted Polar Code’s environmental component (May 2015), which came 
after an adoption of the safety section (November 2014), may strengthen the protection of the 
marine environment (Brigham, 2014). 
Another example of successful governance arrangements in the Arctic may be the self-regulated 
institution of a particular industry. In the case of cruise tourism activities in Svalbard, Jan Mayer 
and Greenland, The Association of Arctic Expedition Cruise Operators (AECO) is an agency that 
represents the concerns and views of Arctic expedition cruise operators (AECO.no, 2016). 
However, the organization is not able to support the development of the Arctic cruise industry, 
since a number of operators are not considering becoming AECO members. 
In addition, local development is strongly connected to the global market trends and requires the 
flexibility of the local governance system. This flexibility may be achieved by the involvement of 
different groups of stakeholders (Westskog et al., in press).   
Given the complexity of the shipping governance system in the Arctic, I will argue that co-
management may be a suitable approach for local shipping governance.  I was inspired by the 
study of Westskog et al. (in press), who applied an adaptive co-management approach for 
Norwegian climate adaptation. There is no single definition of the concept of co-management 
and it is applied in an increasing number ways (Folke et al., 2005). It emphasizes the importance 
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of “user participation in the decision-making and linking communities and government 
managers”. The potential benefits of this approach, according to Armitage et al. (2007, p. 3), are 
“more appropriate, more efficient and more equitable governance.”  
According to Westskog et al. (in press), it presents a suitable framework for multi-level 
governance to ensure pro-active adaptation actions and secure the presence of local knowledge 
and collaboration between relevant actors (Fitchett, 2014).  
As was previously mentioned, an existing top-down approach to shipping governance (global, 
regional and local) shows a clear gap in local engagement (e.g. IMO frameworks, cruise industry 
guidelines, national laws). Despite the UN’s requirement for indigenous input, the IMO still has 
no indigenous representatives (ILO Convention 169, 1989).  In contrast, the adaptive co-
management approach can “create space for local context” on other governance levels and 
secure proactive adaptation (Westskog et al., in press). 
Aaja Chemnitz Larsen, Member of the Danish Parliament (Greenland) started her presentation at 
the High North dialogue by proposing that the human dimension is a key element in sustainable 
development in Greenland and in the Arctic in general. She argues that it is of increasing 
importance to understand the local communities’ needs and challenges. There are about four 
million people living in the Arctic (AHDR, 2004) and they are a central component for future 
development. Using the co-management as a governance approach may help us to understand 
how it is applied and to assess the extent to which the local population is engaged in shipping 
governance. 
The importance of local engagement can be presented in one of the case areas: Longyearbyen. 
Just some weeks ago, the last coal ship left Svalbard and took a third of the local economy away 
from the community. The reduction in coal production has a significant impact on local adaptive 
capacity and community well-being. In order to secure community viability, the economic focus 
has been switched towards more sustainable industries such as tourism, education and research 
(St. Meld. 32, 2015-2016). However, the transition requires flexibility in the local governance 
system for shipping activities, the development of new types of institutional arrangements and 
the engagement/participation of broader groups of stakeholders in local decision-making. 
However, this approach has some limitations. It might be difficult to adopt in practice due to a 
“higher degree of contextualized policy practice” and the possibility of misrepresentation of 
certain relevant groups (Westskog et al., in press).  
 
Conclusion 
Maritime activities in the Arctic are becoming more extensive. The impact of shipping activities 
on local adaptive capacity is not broadly discussed in the scientific literature. Some studies from 
the Canadian Arctic indicate that this development poses a number of challenges for the local 
adaptive capacity of coastal communities that are already experiencing a number of changes in 
their social, political, economic and environmental systems. Therefore, an appropriate 
governance system is required in order to increase the benefits and mitigate the negative impact 
from shipping activities for local communities and to strength local adaptive capacity (Dawson et 
al., 2014). 
In this paper, I have reflected on the complexity and interconnection of three main variables for 
this study. They are: multiple stressors in the Arctic, shipping activities and local communities. 
These interconnections of variables represent an important argument for theoretical choice. In 
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line with Westskog et al. (in press), I will argue that adaptive co-management can be a possible 
governance approach to handling the effects of Arctic shipping activities.   
Although, in this paper, I argue for the choice of theoretical framework, more empirical data is 
needed to support the arguments. Two case areas in the High North are chosen to address the 
assumptions: Longyearbyen (Svalbard) and a local community in the Russian North, which is 
affected by Arkhangelsk port activities. From the presented discussion points, I open the 
discussion for further work that a flexible governance system may serve as a source of adaptive 
capacity. Adaptive co-management may be an appropriate governance approach for local 
shipping activities. The specially designed Polar (Arctic) shipping governance presents an 
innovative solution for marine activities.  
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VALUE CREATION AND GOVERNANCE FOR A FUTURE ARCTIC:  
A VIEW FROM CANADA 
Mark Stoller 
 
This paper addresses issues arising from speculation about future governance for the High North 
in conjunction with growing interests in advancing Arctic research and education.  These two 
topics, which were dominant themes of this year’s High North Dialogue conference, are 
connected by the evident need for continuous improvement in methods of forecasting future 
growth, as well as anticipating modes of value assessment.  With respect to established 
managerial practices and research methodologies, these hold distinct implications for questions 
of governance at both practical and theoretical levels.  In the following sections, I address three 
features of the conference and workshop relating to these questions.  These include a discussion 
of future planning and scenarios; the growing emphasis on uses of environmental regulation in 
the development of value-creating industries; and the potential for ongoing cooperative relations 
among Arctic nations. 
Lessons are drawn from my own doctoral research, which examines questions relating to 
resource extraction and commercial development in the foreseeable future in Canada’s Arctic.  
In particular, I address questions related to the extraction of petroleum and non-renewable 
energies, how these relate to future planning and the governance of Canada’s northern 
territories, and the implications for international environmental law and future Arctic 
development.  In the course of my experience at the High North Dialogue conference in Bodø, 
and my role as a group facilitator with a number of Master’s students in attendance, I have come 
to reflect on several aspects of Arctic future developments and their relevance to my own 
research.  In particular, I examine the role of Canada in the context of the future Arctic and focus 
upon some aspects of the Canadian experience of trying to exploit Arctic resources.  I then 
incorporate these into discussions of futures forecasting, value creation, and governance for the 
High North.  Before going into these, however, I will provide an overview of my research. 
 
Overview: Canada’s experience in the Arctic 
As Professor Oran Young has argued recently, the growth of interest in numerous fields and 
disciplines confirms that the Arctic has arrived as an area of global concern.  In terms of both 
scholarship and matters of national and global politics, researchers and politicians are 
increasingly interested in the High North as the frontline of climate change, as a potential source 
of future energy, mineral, and food resources, and as a region requiring increasingly specialized 
forms of diplomatic cooperation (Young, 2010).  As a result, dialogue frequently focuses on the 
future of the Arctic and on the possibilities for its development over short and long-term 
horizons.  Much of this attention is overwhelmingly positive and hopeful in nature, and it bodes 
well for future governance of the Arctic regions.   
There are, however, many lessons to be learned from Canada’s experience of trying to develop 
the Arctic as a stable and reliable source of industrial and commercial enterprise.  Unlike the 
success experienced by Norway, Canada’s efforts to locate offshore petroleum resources, and to 
establish proven supplies of oil and gas for transport to markets in southern Canada and the 
United States, have roundly failed.  In fact, much of the hopeful language and rhetoric heard 
today about the Arctic’s future potential is remarkably similar to that emanating from Canadian 
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politicians more than 50 years ago, when Canada first launched its own national programme to 
examine the resource potential of the High North.  Many of these failures are attributable to 
historical circumstances (namely, deficiencies in offshore technologies and a highly polarized 
political landscape), but they have a bearing on any anticipated developments.  In particular, 
Canada’s experience offers insights into the relationship between Arctic research and 
development that have important implications for questions of governance, both regionally and 
in the circumpolar Arctic. 
My own research examines Arctic development in Canada and the implications for future 
development, but, owing to Canada’s Arctic experience, it also investigates the role of future 
planning, which is central to this process.  As such, I have studied how various experts and 
politicians have approached the subject of research in the High North and, to a lesser extent, 
where they went wrong.  In particular, I explore how petroleum extraction proposals and 
pipelines came into conflict with economic and political factors.  As I will detail below, I see great 
potential for linking issues of environmental change, resource development, and regional 
governance in the years to come.  Moreover, there is much room to extend the dialogue 
concerning the High North beyond the European and Russian context to be inclusive of matters 
arising through experiences in the North American Arctic.  As numerous presenters at the High 
North Dialogue conference noted, there are many different Arctics to be considered when 
imagining the Blue Future.  I see great value in drawing from Canada’s Arctic history and 
experience to contribute to these discussions. 
 
Scenario-building and futures-forecasting 
Numerous aspects of the High North Dialogue conference, as well as the Master’s and PhD 
courses, addressed the use of scenarios as an instrument of futures forecasting.  On the Master’s 
course, scenario-building exercises were an effective means of conducting mixed-methods 
research involving both qualitative and quantitative analyses (Amer et al., 2013; Overland et al., 
2015).  Scenario exercises were also illustrative of the range of possibilities and challenges for 
future development and helpful in introducing young researchers to the complexities of Arctic 
development. 
In addition to being a highly scientific process, planning for Arctic futures is in many ways a 
creative undertaking.  After all, to envision where the Arctic will be in the year 2030, one must 
also have a strong sense of where it has been before that and where it will be going after.  Of 
particular interest during the High North Dialogue workshop was the recurrent theme of 
imagining the Arctic—both as a natural and political landscape—over the next decade and a half.  
Workshops devoted to scenario-building were effective reminders that nothing is guaranteed for 
the future and that many people share very different ideas, not only about what that future will 
look like but how best to achieve it.  The ability to adapt to unforeseen developments—whether 
they be social, political or environmental—depends largely on the ability of the existing structure 
of governance to be responsive to contemporary and future needs.  With regard to the High 
North, shared regional interests, as well as common challenges to continuous resource 
development, enable us to imagine governmental institutions, traditionally operating at the level 
of the nation-state, now operating across multiple states at the regional level.  
Two things were both informative and instrumental in the process of imagining scenarios and 
their implications for governance for the High North. Firstly, scenario exercises required a base 
knowledge of an assortment of social, political, economic, environmental and cultural issues.  
From the perspective of education, research, and pedagogy, this dimension of the Arctic 
60 
 
environment was a critical reminder that no one area of the High North can be studied in 
isolation; in the same way, problems of governance cannot be resolved according to any single 
doctrine of political will or preference.  Rather, issues ranging from social development, energy 
production, to resources extraction must all be seen within networks of the knowledge, values, 
hopes, and abilities of the many actors involved.  This fact is a reminder of the need to articulate 
clear and wide-ranging standards for training younger people to work in the High North.  As it 
pertains to broader themes of governance addressed throughout the course, there is clearly 
greater need for recognition of the diversity and possibilities of High North development and for 
a deep background knowledge and understanding of the complex issues required to adapt 
quickly to changes that may occur.  Here, the volatility of Arctic development is central.   
As it relates to my own research, I was struck by the importance of Canada’s experience of trying, 
and ultimately failing, to develop a strong and sustainable northern research programme.  While 
the High North Dialogue largely focused on the relationship between Norway and Russia, with 
some attention extended to Finland and Sweden, I see great value in bringing young people 
together from around the circumpolar regions to share knowledge of their understanding of the 
High North and its future.  Ensuring a strengthening of education at both undergraduate and 
graduate levels would go a long way to strengthening the future research network that will be 
needed to ensure responsive and adaptive policy-making in the years ahead.  The scenarios, 
particularly as they were effectively presented as a collection, made clear the need for enhanced 
understanding of the many different issues facing the future of High North development. 
A second observation concerning future development relates to the use of the past to reflect on 
the future.  To understand how future developments will evolve, it remains necessary to 
anticipate the ends of development.  For instance, the subject of abandonment of industrial 
projects was not pursued at the conference, even though it is a topic that has dramatic 
implications for the environmental integrity of the High North.  Mining, in particular, offers an 
excellent example of the need to imagine a future beyond the mere starting of new development 
activities—to their conclusion or termination.  What happens when a mine closes?  What would 
be the local consequences if a major fish farm were to collapse?  Issues related to abandonment 
and closure require a closer understanding of the social consequences of High North 
development and the need to see beyond the initial period of innovation and start-up.  Greater 
incorporation of social indicators into the planning of future Arctic development highlights the 
need for a continuous commitment to growing the diverse knowledge base of the High North. 
In light of Canada’s experience and struggles to develop sustainable economies in the High North, 
there is a strong need for training and education in the fields of socio-economic monitoring 
throughout the lifespan of commercial development projects.  Much like the scenario-building 
exercises, training and education require a thorough understanding of the issues and challenges 
of working in the High North.  The scenario model could even be adapted to address social 
challenges, bringing together research and information from industry with regional demographic 
statistics and indicators.  Combining industry and commercial scenarios with those specifically 
related to social development would allow for a sounder project selection process and expand 
the time horizon through the entire tenure of the project.  In areas of abandonment, delay, and 
termination, Canadian researchers could contribute greatly to scenarios linking the concerns and 
interests of industry with social factors and local concerns. 
The very practice of imagining Arctic futures thus opens a range of possibilities for High North 
development.  These possibilities reveal the enthusiasm and shared interest in Arctic growth, but 
they also underscore the inherent uncertainty of futures forecasting.  
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Environmental regulation as a regional imperative 
In posing questions of future growth and development, we encounter the growing influence of 
ecological and biophysical matters as they relate to questions of value creation, management, 
and governance.  A second area of interest joining my own research with the materials and 
lessons of the High North Dialogue conference lies in the political value associated with 
environmental legislation.   As is now clear, concerns for shared ecosystems have widened the 
array of stakeholders with legitimate interests in regional development.  In addition, 
environmental concerns—and the scale at which they operate—require closer coordination 
between government and corporate managers (Näsi et al., 1997).   Within the current context of 
Arctic dialogues and joint-planning, ecological concerns present perhaps the strongest argument 
for extending conventional state-oriented notions of governance to the regional level.  As 
communicated in the lectures by numerous presenters, economic designs must be oriented to 
accommodate environmental best practices.  This is a key component of what accountants now 
refer to as the triple-bottom-line.  In the context of global climate change and the particular 
effects on governance in the High North, policies related to environmental, ecological, and 
biophysical knowledge could assist in the shift from state to regional modes of governance.  How 
will this knowledge be shared in the future?  What will its implications be for resolving conflicts 
that emerge or for jointly and cooperatively developing Arctic resources?  Certainly, these are 
important questions that were raised in both the context of Norwegian-Russian relations as well 
as those concerning Nordic countries more generally.  Here again are some lessons from Canada, 
which may hold some broader implications for the conduct of international relations among 
Arctic and non-Arctic states with interests in the High North. 
Canada’s ongoing territorial dispute with the United States in the Beaufort Sea exemplifies the 
diplomatic value of scientific and environmental knowledge.  In some respects, scientific 
knowledge is seen to facilitate diplomatic cooperation between the two countries, despite 
disagreement on the boundary line between them.  The collection of data concerning the 
mapping of the seabed, for instance, is conducted jointly by both the Canadian and American 
coastguard and research vessels.  While the matter of adjudicating the dispute is ultimately a 
legal question, the fact that scientific knowledge gathering serves as a common objective 
between the two nations clearly compels them to work together, most likely to find a bilateral 
solution.  As is now widely recognized among Arctic actors—and secured through various 
agreements by the Arctic Council concerning search and rescue, as well as oil spill clean-up—
states cannot act alone in the Arctic.  The shared commitment to scientific knowledge and 
integrity in the Arctic potentially has a role in international relations. In the High North, the free 
flow of scientific knowledge, data, and best practices could be used as a safeguard against the 
potential for escalating conflict and play an important role in mitigating tensions.  In doing so, it 
can also help moderate and facilitate an equitable rate of commercial and socio-economic 
growth. 
Therefore, expansion of the ‘stakeholder’ category, and the trans-national imperatives presented 
by ecological challenges, demand close cooperation in researching and sharing vital information 
related to developing best practices.  Environmental issues must continue to be conceived as a 
regional imperative and require coordination of development programmes between nations.  If 
taken seriously, this can be a source of long-term cooperation among Arctic actors and 
stakeholders. 
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High North governance and cooperation of Arctic states 
In the contemporary research and development environment, there has been increased 
emphasis on the adoption of a stakeholder approach to strategic management.  In the literature, 
this applies mostly to the management of businesses and organizations.  As Freeman suggests, 
the value of this approach can be discerned by a closer understanding of the ‘logic’ of stakeholder 
theory, rather than a narrow adherence to a particular methodology (Freeman, 2004, p. 230).  In 
any discipline there remains the potential for the methodology to shape the logic—and thus the 
outcome—of practices related to research, management, and governance.  This insight is integral 
to how value is assessed and ultimately created in the High North, where there has been a recent 
surge in academic research and discussion around managerial practices.  In particular, it 
highlights the need to develop and articulate the objectives and concerns regarding future Arctic 
development.  As outlined throughout this paper, High North cooperation and development 
depends greatly on the coordination of governmental, corporate, and academic interests, and 
thus on the adoption of methods of research and organization specifically suited to this purpose.  
Methodologies of Arctic management and research must reflect the ‘logic’ of High North 
governance.  
A strict adherence to methods designed within one discipline, but not cognizant of or responsive 
to the concerns of others, undermines and threatens the broader aims of regional governance.  
The research and collection of environmental data, for instance, requires expanding the 
knowledge base available to policy-makers and diplomats beyond the conventional bounds of 
the national interest.  In creating value for the High North in the future—whether this concerns 
the Arctic Ocean or land-based development—there is clearly a greater need to approach 
development with knowledge of the transnational implications of climate change. The immediate 
effect of this should be the inclusion of non-state agents and actors in the dialogue of northern 
development.  New opportunities for the growth of High North and Arctic studies, with a focus 
on international research, could then lead to the development of stronger post-secondary and 
graduate training and research programmes.  Certainly, in North America, there is a lack of 
research opportunities that focus specifically on the unique aspects of Arctic research.  The fact 
that there is a strong interest in both Norwegian and Russian education centres, as well as those 
of Finland and Sweden, indicates the potential for strong research networks to emerge 
throughout the circumpolar region.  As a form of soft diplomacy, the sharing of research and 
educational opportunities could hold positive implications for the future of the High North.  
Another aspect of High North environmental scientific knowledge and cooperative development 
concerns the pace of growth and regional change.  As was made clear with the scenario-building 
exercises, if cooperation is to continue as the norm of regional relations, it is essential that Arctic 
states develop the shared capacity to respond to unpredictable changes.  Where research can 
play a role in this is in helping to moderate an equitable pace of development among all Arctic 
states, ensuring that no nation is isolated from this process.  Shared standards of technology and 
innovation, for instance, are essential for ensuring the most effective search and rescue response 
rate.  The logical extension of this form of technological diplomacy is the creation of a strong 
pollution prevention regime, one that takes into account the common interests in protecting the 
High North’s marine ecosystem, in particular.  
In these ways—the extension of the northern research network to be more inclusive of non-state 
actors and researchers, and the sharing of technology and knowledge to ensure a high standard 
of response to unforeseen changes—research in the High North can play a pivotal role in the 
future of High North growth and development.  Where Canada and the United States have 
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worked closely in recent years to jointly develop techniques for mapping the Arctic seabed and 
exchanging essential information related to ice-conditions and rates of climate change, there is 
clearly a great opportunity to extend this network to circumpolar neighbours.  In doing so, a 
strong Arctic knowledge regime can be assured an important role in the future of High North 
international relations.   
 
Conclusion 
In his exploration of governance and its relevance to research, Marc Hufty elaborates the need 
for mechanisms of governance to act as an analytical tool that is not “specific to a particular time 
and space…It should be possible to use the same tool to analyse social dynamics at various levels, 
in different societies and times” (Hufty, 2011, p. 178).  Based upon the history of development in 
the High North, and with regard to stated ambitions for its future, I must disagree with this point.  
The many presentations and exercises at the High North Dialogue conference confirm the 
importance of aspiring to modes of governance, dialogue, research and education that are 
specifically suited to the unique conditions of the circumpolar Arctic.  While this entails a range 
of diverse situations and factors requiring solutions at different levels, it should, nevertheless, be 
a principle of future governance and development.  Although this fact should not be the basis for 
excluding participants from or including them in serious discussions about the future of the High 
North, it must be established as the basis for any serious efforts to prepare for this future. 
Based upon my own research into environmental politics and northern development, I have 
addressed several areas of overlap and lessons acquired from the High North Dialogue 
conference and workshops.  The conclusions can be summarized as follows.  Firstly, through 
scenario development and future forecasting, it is clear that High North governance entails a very 
wide range of complex and interrelated issues.  This makes it necessary to adopt methods that 
are both flexible and responsive to the specific conditions of the High North.  Rather than treating 
the inherent unpredictability of the Arctic future as a source of concern and anxiety, futures 
forecasting should be embraced as a means to promote enduring cooperation between 
stakeholders and to simultaneously commit to long-term educational and research programmes 
that focus on the specific and changing dimensions of High North governance.  Secondly, and 
with this in mind, the environment itself can be viewed as an increasingly active agent in how 
value is determined and in what form of governance is best-suited to meet the ever-changing 
needs of ecological concerns.  How environmental challenges are assessed is critical to the 
evolution of value creation in the Arctic and must therefore be forefront in the minds of planners, 
managers, and stakeholders.  As before, the ecological issues present new opportunities to 
encourage regional cooperation and sustainable modes of governance.  Finally, research and 
management must always be cognizant of the ‘logic’ of governance in the High North.  Questions 
of governance cannot be reduced to isolated methodologies but must also evolve.  For this 
reason, it is imperative that educational programmes be continuously supported by governments 
and stakeholders, and that younger generations of researchers be encouraged to participate, to 
grow their knowledge of the region, and ultimately to contribute to dialogues regarding the High 
North’s future.  The education of young researchers, and the extension of education and research 
networks, is absolutely essential to meeting this objective.  It is my hope that a growing network 
of researchers will be encouraged to share their research at international forums, such as the 
High North conference and workshops, and that those working in the Nordic and Russian Arctics 
will be similarly encouraged to expand their networks to the North American Arctics. 
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GOVERNANCE IN THE HIGH NORTH: FROM THE HIGH NORTH to SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING 
STATES (SIDS) 
Neil Oculi 
 
Introduction 
The subject of climate change is so broad that its impact has been described as more than just 
the greatest ecological issue of our time: it is also the most significant political and moral issue of 
our time. Expert groups such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) have noted that: 
 
“Climate change and associated sea-level rise have disproportionately greater impacts on 
SIDS, particularly atolls, and other small island states that have high vulnerability but low 
adaptive capacity. Damage from extreme events, including salinization of freshwater and 
agricultural land, increased flooding and forced migrations are among the challenges that 
SIDS are already confronting. Given the trajectory of global greenhouse gas emissions, these 
events will continue to adversely affect the environment and socio-economic development 
in SIDS.”11 
 
This paper focuses on areas in which my research has benefited from the High North Dialogue. 
In the assignment, I will first provide a brief background of my research. I will then underscore 
the importance of scenario analysis as a tool and methodological approach for my research, by 
demonstrating how various theoretical and practical approaches in the course can be 
incorporated in my own research. Thirdly, I will connect the issues of the Arctic to that of the 
Small Island Developing State (SIDS) to demonstrate how sea-level rise and melting ice in the 
Arctic region affect SIDS. Fourthly, I will discuss adaptation policies in the High North, drawing 
from lessons learnt / success from fisheries and other relevant industries as possible sustainable 
economic solutions for SIDS.  
 
Background  
One of the most dominant schools of thought in international relations is that small states do not 
matter because of their lack of military and economic capabilities. This realist worldview assumes 
that Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are irrelevant in international negotiations. As 
Thorhallsson and Wivel (2006) indicate, the most conventional definition of small states would 
be in terms of their “capabilities, that is, the possession of power resources in absolute or relative 
terms.” Meanwhile, climate change and the outcomes of international climate negotiations will 
determine their survival. However, SIDS are independent nations and have a right to sovereignty. 
Therefore my research question is this: How can SIDS exert their interest in global climate change 
politics? In order to unpack this question, my research analyses SIDS’ vulnerabilities within a 
                                                     
11 Outcome of the UNEP-UNDESA Workshop on SIDS Emerging Issues 14-16 MAY, 2013 
Cambridge, United Kingdom (Preliminary Version)  
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socioeconomic, geophysical, and political framework to understand how they can exert their 
interest in global processes such as the United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
There are important themes governing my research: vulnerability assessment; sea-level rise; and 
adaptation and mitigation policies.  
As Ashe et al. (1999) explain, “The geopolitical realities at the international level in general, and 
at the United Nations in particular, are such that the small states of the developing world have 
been lumped together with neighbouring continental states in regional groups.” Such 
classification or arrangement may make sense at the geopolitical level but negates or ignores the 
special circumstances of small-island and low-lying coastal states—with small populations, 
limited natural and human resources, and dis-economies of scale with single or few export 
goods—that make them vulnerable to external shocks. Because small states are historically 
grouped into all-encompassing developing countries (the Group of 77 and China) within the UN 
processes, they are at a disadvantage when competing for multilateral funds for country-specific 
programmes. The insularity and remoteness of these small states, as well as the fact that they 
must compete with continental developing countries for resources, made it clear to these small 
nation states: in order to survive, they must not stay on the sidelines but have legitimate and 
autonomous claims at the negotiations. These realities led to the formation of the Alliance of 
Small Island States (AOSIS). 
AOSIS is a coalition of small-island and low-lying coastal countries (with a membership of 44 
states and observers) that share similar development challenges and concerns about the 
environment, especially their vulnerability to the adverse effects of global climate change.12 
AOSIS represents the voice of SIDS within the UN processes.  
SIDS are among the most vulnerable states as a result of many geopolitical factors such as size, 
location, systems of government and production. These countries are highly dependent on the 
ocean and its resources for their survival. However, current patterns of consumption, production, 
and development have triggered global climate change, resulting in sea-level rise, which in turn 
threatens the livelihood and sovereignty of these small and vulnerable island states. The shared 
vulnerabilities of SIDS have led to the formation of AOSIS, an important ad hoc coalition of 
nations, whose cultural heritage, languages and economies differ greatly. The overarching 
principle or goal that unites AOSIS is their shared vulnerability to climate change.  
 
Scenario analysis  
Scenario studies are becoming more useful, in both policy and academia. Amer et al. (2013) 
explain that, “In the present era characterized by uncertainty, innovation and change, increasing 
emphasis is being placed on the use of scenario-planning techniques because of its usefulness in 
times of uncertainty and complexity. Scenario-planning stimulates strategic thinking and helps to 
overcome thinking limitations by creating multiple futures.” This is a relevant approach in 
implementing strategies to deal with climate change. One of the important aspects of my 
research is to help formulate policies. In order to do that, it is important to try to predict the 
future as accurately as possible. There are many tools to help determine the future. One of those 
is science. Use of the best science that is available helps to formulate concrete policies extending 
into the future. Scenario analysis within my research will help with the governance of SIDS. In 
respect of governance, Stoker (1998) outlines five elements:  
                                                     
12 About AOSIS http://aosis.org/about-aosis/ 
67 
 
 
“Governance refers to a set of institutions and actors that are drawn from but also beyond       
government.  
Governance identifies the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and 
economic issues.  
Governance identifies the power dependence involved in the relationships between institutions 
involved in collective action.  
Governance is about autonomous self-governing networks of actors. 
Governance recognizes the capacity to get things done which does not rest on the power of 
government to command or use its authority. It sees government as able to use new tools and 
techniques to steer and guide”.  
I argue that scenario analysis intertwines with governance. This argument is in line with Professor 
(Emerita) Salme Nasi’s lecture, in which she demonstrated that sustainable development and 
governance are critical elements for policy prescription. In his lecture, Professor Indre Overland 
argued that it is very difficult to predict the future because of many uncertainties. In climate 
research, a major uncertainty is the fact the process-based models cannot capture the full 
response of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheet. This creates policy implications. However, my 
research seeks to better understand vulnerability. The assessment of vulnerability to climate 
change aims to inform the development of policies that reduce the risks associated with climate 
change (Füssel and Klein, 2006). Employing scenario analysis to the assessment of climate 
vulnerability provides a concrete and practical way to visualize the future, in order to try to 
mitigate the adverse effects of climate change. 
By evaluating the impacts of climate change on SIDS, I can provide various scenarios to help guide 
policy within SIDS. The time-honoured methodologies, used by Overland et al. (2015) to describe 
three possible scenarios for Barents Sea oil and gas for 2025, provide a very useful approach to 
explore. As indicated by Overland et al. (2015), such scenario approaches do not attempt to 
forecast or make projections; instead, they find alternative possibilities that utilize the 
unpredictable nature between multiple factors. This is very important because of the 
multifaceted complexities of climate change and its many uncertainties. This approach 
understands the importance of human interaction by Norwegians and Russians in the Barents 
Sea and has crafted the scenarios to reflect these interactions. Human interaction cannot be 
overlooked when examining the implications of climate change within SIDS. Overland et al. 
(2015) provide a framework to include more human interaction in my own research. By utilizing 
a radar diagram as explained in both the various workshops and literature of the course 
(Overland et al., 2015), I can visually demonstrate the unique fingerprints of various scenarios 
and their uncertainties.   
 
Sea-level rise  
One of the biggest issues threatening the High North is sea-level rise. One reason for this is that 
the temperature in the Arctic is rising two to three times more than the global mean. However, 
much of the talk during the conference indicated that the Arctic is a treasure box of resources, if 
it is harvested sustainably. In her presentation, Grete Ellingensen, State Secretary, Norwegian 
Ministry of Local Government and Modernization, echoed these sentiments. As previously 
indicated, there are many uncertainties when predicting sea-level rise and what may be deemed 
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sustainable may present more challenges in the future. Even with the most robust climate model 
projection, there will still be many uncertainties when evaluating sea-level rise, on both a global 
and regional scale. While much work is being done to reduce these uncertainties, the Coupled 
Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5), used in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report, does not incorporate the dynamic response of the ocean 
to meltwater input or the glacial isostatic adjustment (GIA)/rotational/gravitational processes 
associated with this ice mass loss (IPCC, 2013). Whatever happens in the High North affects the 
realities of SIDS. For this reason, I am interested in the policies of the High North and how the 
ocean is managed.  
One implication of sea-level rise is that it increases coastal vulnerability. Coastal vulnerability 
encompasses several constantly changing bio-geophysical, climatic, and non-climatic factors 
(Addo, 2013; Ramieri et al., 2011) (Table 1). Some of these include “height and direction, wind 
speed, water depth, sediment supply, removal and transport along the coast, strength of tides, 
rates of relative sea level change, as well as rainfall and the frequency and intensity of extreme 
meteorological and climate events, including storm surges” (Ramieri et al., 2011).  
 
 
Table 1 Bio-geophysical effects of sea level rise including relevant interacting climate and non-
climate stresses. Source: Ramieri et al. (2011). 
 
Adaptation  
One of my personal highlights of the conference on The Blue Future of the Arctic was my dialogue 
with Aaja Chemnitz Larsen, Greenlandic Member of the Danish Parliament. We had a very 
intellectual and thoughtful conversation about the politics of the High North, especially regarding 
the Greenlandic/Danish relationship. Much of our conversation focused on climate change and 
adaptation, in the context of both the High North and SIDS. We expressed our concern in respect 
of the deglaciation of the Greenland ice sheets. There is strong evidence that total or partial 
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deglaciation of the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets may contribute to a large increase 
in sea-level rise (Nicholls et al., 2007; Parry, 2007). Such sea-level rise will negatively impact the 
adaptive capacity of both SIDS and Greenland. 
Aaja Chemnitz Larsen explained that the two largest municipalities in the world are in Greenland. 
I agree that development in the Arctic should focus on the human dimension. A major part of my 
research examines social vulnerability and the human dimension of climate change adaptation. 
As with SIDS, the economic situation in Greenland is very fragile. Greenland is taking steps 
towards independence, which I can relate to my research, since most SIDS are former colonies 
and some are still colonies.  An important area of adaptation is the idea that countries have the 
right to self-government.  
Adaptation policies and actions are decided based on financial, technical and institutional 
resources. As indicated by Aaja Chemnitz Larsen, there is a growing international perspective in 
the Arctic region and Greenland, but the primary interest must be the people of the Arctic.  A 
holistic approach to the human dimension of the Arctic is of paramount importance. The EU seal 
ban has affected the livelihood of Greenlanders, costing them millions of dollars. Fisheries, 
mining, tourism, and industries are the key drivers for economic growth, with fisheries playing 
the main role in food and the economy.  
Adaptation presents multiple challenges because it involves the nonlinear dynamic of socio-
ecological systems. It also involves competition among multiple management goals at various 
levels. As indicated by Perry (2015), “Climate change adaptation is a wicked problem.” Adaption 
policies and implementation for both SIDS and the High North, especially within coastal 
communities, is characterized as this “wicked problem” that is driven by physical, environment, 
and human drivers (Fig. 1). In describing a “wicked problem”, Perry argued that a major 
constraint in dealing with climate change is that “There are no clear-cut solutions, and 
stakeholders at each site disagree on values, norms and first steps, making adaptation difficult. 
Yet, delaying action poses more risks than taking action under uncertainty.” 
There are many lessons that SIDS could learn from both research and policies within the High 
North. Countries like Norway have been able to successfully implement and modernize the 
fisheries industry as they adapt new technologies to deal with the growing demand for seafood. 
Like Norway, SIDS depend on the ocean or sea to foster economic stability. It is important that 
policy-makers within SIDS work with those in the High North, especially at the international level, 
through various treaties such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
and The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
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Fig. 1: Climate, just as anthropogenic or natural variability, affects both climatic and human 
related drivers. Risk facing coastal systems is the outcome of integrating drivers' associated 
hazards, exposure, and vulnerability. Adaptation options can be implemented to modify either 
the hazards or the exposure and vulnerability, or both. Source: Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) by Working Group II (2014) 
 
Conclusions 
Climate change is one of the biggest challenges facing mankind. The paper summarizes some of 
the implications of climate change for both the High North and SIDS. It is clear that, whatever 
happens in the High North in terms of sea-level rise or exploitation of natural resources, it will 
impact SIDS, both geophysically and socioeconomically. Sea-level rise in the High North is 
increasing much faster and affecting coastal communities. Adapting to these changes requires 
immediate actions. While it is extremely difficult to predict the future, scenario analysis provides 
one framework to help prepare for the challenges that climate change brings. This paper calls for 
greater synergies between the High North and SIDS at the international level, through global 
environmental treaties such as UNCLOS and UNFCCC.  
 
References  
Addo, K.A. (2013) ‘Assessing coastal vulnerability index to climate change: The case of Accra-
Ghana’, Journal of Coastal Research, 2(65), p. 1892. 
Amer, M., Daim, T.U. and Jetter, A. (2013) ‘A review of scenario planning’, Futures, 46, pp. 23-40. 
Ashe, J.W., Lierop, R. and Cherian, A. (1999) ‘The role of the alliance of small island states (AOSIS) 
in the negotiation of the United Nations framework convention on climate change 
(UNFCCC)’, in Natural Resources Forum, 23(3), pp. 209-220. Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
71 
 
Füssel, H.-M., and Klein, R.J.T. (2006) ‘Climate change vulnerability assessments: An evolution of 
conceptual thinking’, Climatic Change, 75(3), pp. 301-329. 
IPCC (2014) Climate change 2014: Impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. Part A: Global and 
sectoral aspects. Contribution of working group II to the fifth assessment report of the 
intergovernmental panel on climate change [Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, V.R., Dokken, D.J., 
Mach, K.J., Mastrandrea, M.D., Bilir, T.E., Chatterjee, M., Ebi, K.L., Estrada, Y.O., Genova, 
R.C., Girma, B., Kissel, E.S., Levy, A.N., MacCracken, S., Mastrandrea, P.R. and White, L.L. 
(eds.)]. Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 
1132 pp. 
IPCC (2013) Climate change 2013: The physical science basis. Contribution of working group I to 
the fifth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change [Stocker, 
T.F., Qin, D., Plattner, G.-K., Tignor, M., Allen, S.K., Boschung, J., Nauels, A., Xia, Y., Bex, V. 
and Midgley, P.M. (eds.)].Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge 
University Press, 1535 pp. 
 
Nicholls, R.J., Wong, P.P., Burkett, V.R., Codignotto, J.O., Hay, J.O., McLean, R.F., Ragoonaden, S. 
and Woodroffe, C.D. (2007) ‘Coastal systems and low-lying areas’, in Parry, L.M., Canziani, 
O.F., Palutikof, J.P., van der Linden, P.J. and Hanson, C.E. (eds.) Climate change 2007: 
Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Contribution of working group II to the fourth 
assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge UK: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 315-356. 
Overland, I., Bambulyak, A., Bourmistrov, A., Gudmestad, O., Mellemvik, F. and Zolotukhin, A. 
(2015) ‘Barents Sea oil and gas 2025’, International Arctic Petroleum Cooperation: 
Barents Sea Scenarios, p. 11. 
Parry, M.L. ed. (2007) Climate Change 2007- Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Working 
Group II Contribution to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC. Vol. 4. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Perry, J. (2015) ‘Climate change adaptation in the world's best places: A wicked problem in need 
of immediate attention’, Landscape and Urban Planning, 133, pp. 1-11. 
Ramieri, E., Hartley, A., Barbanti, A.,  Santos, F.D., Gomes, A., Hilden, M., Laihonen, P., Marinova, 
N. and Santini, M. (2011) ‘Methods for assessing coastal vulnerability to climate change’, 
ETC CCA technical paper 1/2011.European Environment Agency, European Topic Centre 
on Climate Change Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation.  
Stoker, G. (1998) ‘Governance as theory: Five propositions’, International Social Science 
Journal, 50(155), pp. 17-28. 
Thorhallsson, B. and Wivel, A. (2006) ‘Small states in the European Union: What do we know and 
what would we like to know?’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 19.4, pp. 651-
668. 
  
72 
 
FEELING THE FUTURE: THE AMBIGUOUS POWER OF ANTICIPATORY STRATEGIES  
Valeria Guerrieri 
 
Abstract 
Anticipatory strategies such as scenario-planning are increasingly employed in different sectors 
and considered valuable tools of governance. Drawing from my experience as a participant at the 
High North Dialogue 2016, I argue in this paper that these anticipatory practices, highly praised 
by both academics and businesses, often reveal particular and biased visions of the future, 
stressing some aspects and inevitably omitting others. 
By connecting the presentation of scenarios to the development of energy infrastructures such 
as pipelines, I suggest that what these future plans have in common is the ability to exercise a 
rather ambiguous form of power by means of hope. Hope is in fact addressed here, not as an 
inherently passive feeling but, on the contrary, as profoundly dynamic and—because it is exposed 
to a more or less high degree of manipulation—also capable of mobilizing action. 
I emphasize then that through anticipation, which is the very particular and productive temporal 
disposition set into motion by hope, the future is made alive in the present, thus not only creating 
a more intense awareness but also encouraging people to shape their behaviours, choices and 
aspirations, according to the future which has been anticipated for them. 
 
The High North Dialogue 2016: A premise   
During the High North Dialogue 2016, students and scholars of diverse disciplines, together with 
the representatives of the major Arctic industries, including oil and gas, mining, fishing and 
shipping, gathered in Bodø (Norway) “…to discuss and develop ideas for the future of the Arctic 
region”13. Before the two-day conference, where the main theme was ‘The Blue Future of the 
Arctic’, MA and PhD students, divided into groups, were assigned the task of building three 
scenarios for the development of the High North in the next 16 years, including the implications 
for a specific sector. Being one of the course participants, I was directly involved in the scenario-
planning exercise, which resulted in a ten-minute presentation and was eventually evaluated by 
a very diversely composed jury. The group awarded the highest score was then given the 
opportunity to present their three scenarios during the conference, in front of a quite assorted 
audience of experts, academics, representatives of industries and think tanks. The High North 
Dialogue, which this year celebrated its 12th edition, is to be placed within a wider framework of 
public arenas focused on the Arctic (such as, for example, the Arctic Circle or Arctic Frontiers), 
where the recurring use of anticipatory strategies, and of scenarios in particular, is encouraged 
and supported. 
 
Scenario-planning: Predicting or inventing the future?  
Before analysing the kind of future that is proposed during public gatherings such as the High 
North Dialogue (HND), I would like to explain what scenario-planning is and in what fields it has 
been employed.  
                                                     
13 From the Program of the HND 2016, available at http://www.highnorthdialogue.no/previous-conferences/2016-
high-north-dialogue/ (Accessed 30 May, 2016) 
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First of all, it is worth stressing that scenario-building is one of the most commonly used methods 
in foresight. Differently from forecasting (Armstrong, 1985; Martino, 1983), which consists of 
estimating what the future might look like by means of mainly quantitative methods 
(calculations, statistics), foresight is the process “…of creating an understanding and appreciation 
of information generated by looking ahead” (Coates, 1985, p. 30). Through the use of mostly 
qualitative methods and the participation of different actors, foresight aims to generate visions 
of the future which—because of the communication effect produced by the pre-assessment of 
the future (Martin and Johnston, 1999)—will inevitably direct decisions in the present. In this 
sense, it is essential to emphasize that the communication aspect is itself considered to be at the 
basis of foresight (Cuhls, 2003) and, consequently, also of scenarios.  Despite the various uses 
that have been made of them, scenario techniques are originally “firmly rooted in the military” 
(Bradfield et al., 2005, p. 797) and have been widely used by military strategists in so-called war 
game simulations. Back in the 1960s, Herman Kahn, nuclear strategist and one of the most 
famous futurists, defined scenario-planning as a “set of hypothetical events set in the future 
constructed to clarify a possible chain of causal events as well as their decision points” (Kahn and 
Wiener, 1967, p. 6). Kahn, who was the head of strategic planning at the US Research and 
Development Corporation,  believed that scenarios could help  “think the unthinkable” and find 
alternatives to otherwise already written futures. His methodology was soon also applied to 
public policy and since then has been broadly used in both the private and public sectors.  
At a corporate level, the multinational oil and gas company, Royal Dutch Shell, is known for 
having been a pioneer in the exercise of foresight, thanks to the scenarios built by Pierre Wack 
and his colleagues (Wack, 1985a; 1985b). The approach developed by Shell, the so-called 
“intuitive logics school” (Coyle, 2004), consists firstly of identifying some key assumptions or 
driving forces, which will somehow influence the success or failure of a specific choice (e.g. an 
investment); the second step is aimed at determining some uncertainties, which, depending on 
whether they are given a higher or lower value, will also have an impact on the building of the 
scenarios. Combined together, driving forces and uncertainties will then produce a scenario, 
which, if assumed to turn into reality, will also have certain implications. Pierre Wack’s planning 
abilities are believed to have significantly helped Shell to foresee the 1973 global oil crisis and to 
consequently prompt the company to anticipate and adapt to the ensuing crises. However, it is 
worth emphasizing that scenarios are not developed by one person alone but are rather the 
outcome of a wider collaborative process involving different parts. As in fact highlighted by 
Willmore (1998, p. 2), “Most scenario planning takes place, initially, within a team context”. The 
presence of multiple participants is then seen as an essential element to test the consistency and 
plausibility of the scenario, which will also be more meaningful and relevant if it has been 
reviewed by different members.  
During my involvement in the scenario exercise, my team was composed of nine people, all from 
very different cultural and academic backgrounds. One of the moments that I personally found 
most challenging was the initial phase, which I called “brainstorming”, which, as I explained to 
my team, consisted of identifying all together the core assumptions, i.e. the most relevant factors 
that would surely affect the development of the Arctic in the next 16 years. As we were told 
during the morning lecture, this step being unavoidable and necessarily the first one to take in 
order to begin our scenario-building, in the case of disagreements within the group, we should 
have considered the assumptions under dispute rather as uncertainties, which would then be 
further discussed in the second phase. However, the fierce objections expressed by some 
members of the team regarding the degree of certainty of some factors, such as for example the 
rise of non-Arctic states or unstoppable technological development, made the brainstorming 
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phase very long and often difficult to handle. Therefore, after a couple of hours, I began to realize 
that what was going on within those four walls was not simply a spontaneous generation of ideas 
meant to be communicated to me and written down on the blackboard but an actual negotiation, 
of which I was expected to be the moderator. Somehow, despite not being immediately aware 
of it, I had been placed within what Torre et al. call a “messy social space” (2008, p. 25), an arena 
where the interactions among the several participants are inevitably bound to be messy and 
often hostile but ultimately also productive. Throughout the brainstorming, I was often drawn 
into negotiating between conflicting views (Askins and Pain, 2011) or even pushed to end some 
persistent arguments, by stressing my (assumed) more authoritative/persuasive opinion as the 
only PhD student among eight Master’s students.  
Now, although I am completely conscious that scenario-building is usually enacted within more 
‘organized’ contexts, where the people who are involved can rely on a solid experience using this 
technique, nevertheless I found the exercise performed within the Nord University ‘microcosm’ 
incredibly interesting and quite revealing. I will try to explain here why.  
It is important to know that, in spite of some criticism (Schoemaker, 1993; 1998), scenarios are 
generally considered useful tools to call attention to some—more or less realistic—possibilities 
and, by doing so, to strategically direct action in order to prevent or accelerate their realization 
(Amer et al., 2012; Hiltunen, 2009). Therefore, I do not intend here to assess the validity of this 
technique; rather, my intention is to investigate how scenario-planning inevitably ends up 
creating particular visions of the future. In this sense, participating in person in the contested 
building of a scenario and directly experiencing, hour after hour, the multiple disputes and the 
subsequent achievement of compromises, has encouraged me to reflect on how the visions of 
the future that emerge from the scenarios are discursively constructed. I argue in fact that, in the 
intersections of the multiple points of conflict which arose during our brainstorming, a more or 
less conscious power exercise was enacted by each of the group participants, who inevitably tried 
to make his/her vision of the future appear more plausible and relevant, by excluding or 
contesting the others. This attempt to focus the attention on particular and biased images of the 
future was, in my opinion, present also in the context of the HND conference, where—
throughout the different presentations—some key factors or assumptions were highlighted and 
others were authoritatively neglected. Therefore, I suggest that gatherings like the HND, in which 
the future is continuously discussed and powerfully communicated to the audience, are also the 
settings in which certain discourses—and therefore truths—are produced and articulated.   
I use the word ‘discourse’ here with clear reference to the French philosopher, Michel Foucault. 
According to Foucault, in fact, a discourse is “a limited number of statements” (1972, p. 117), 
which embody only a particular way of talking about and understanding a specific phenomenon, 
consequently ruling out other possible interpretations of the same. Discourses, which are the 
product of power, are, at their source, both constraining and productive at the same time, 
because if, on the one hand, they exclude some perspectives, on the other hand they also create 
and help circulate truth or, at least, what is believed (and accepted) as truth. Discourses thus 
“arrest the flow of differences” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 112) and, by reducing the 
possibilities, exercise a control on what can be said and what cannot be said, what has to be 
perceived as true and what as false. In the same way, as I see it, scenario-building is a foresight 
strategy, which discursively selects some ‘truer’ visions of the future and consequently 
marginalizes others. In fact, although not completely excluding other possibilities—it is worth 
noticing in fact that often, including during the conference, different and contrasting scenarios 
are presented at the same time—the projections are always more or less explicitly influenced by 
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the goals of the actor who is in charge of them, whether it is a company, an organization or an 
individual.  
In this sense, Management Professor Paul Raimond poses an interesting question in one of his 
articles, by asking: “Are we predicting the future or inventing it?” (1996). As he explains, if 
prediction is a forecasting strategy focused on evaluating the external market forces and 
conditions which might influence the development of the company and make predictions 
accordingly, invention is much more creative and relies more on the personal skills of the 
strategist, who believes that, since the future market cannot be predicted, it is then necessary 
“to create dominance” (p. 209). Although Raimond’s research interests lie mostly in strategic 
thinking applied to companies, I nevertheless find it quite interesting to question and investigate 
the nature of foresight and other anticipatory strategies. As a result, I am more inclined to think 
of these as not merely (or possibly not at all) aimed at predicting the future but, rather, at 
creating specific conditions and supporting specific discourses in the present.   
 
The power of hope 
In my research project, The Productive Power of the Pipeline, I analyse how energy 
infrastructures, specifically pipelines, even when they are still at a proposal stage and thus not 
physically built yet, nevertheless manage to trigger enormous transformations in the regions they 
are expected to cross.  
The reason why this happens, as I suggest, is because pipelines are very powerful entities, which 
are capable of exercising a certain degree of control and influence by means of their potentiality. 
As potential objects—and by ‘potential’ here I mean something which, although not yet existing, 
does produce some manifestation in the actuality (Agamben, 1999)—these not-yet-built 
infrastructures become capable of producing very strong effects and of deeply affecting choices, 
behaviours and policies in the present.  
As I see it, the same line of thinking can be applied to the scenarios which are proposed during 
public events such as the HND. Although, as I have previously explained, these anticipatory 
strategies have become a fundamental tool of modern governance and business development, I 
believe that the study of instruments of foresight should not stop at a mere description and 
review of their methods and different employments. It should first of all acknowledge their huge 
influence as tools, not to predict the future but to proactively move towards it. Like pipelines, 
anticipatory practices push people to envision a future which, although not yet there, feels 
extremely vivid in its present-ness.  
At this point then one could easily ask: How do they succeed in doing so? How can pipelines or 
future scenarios actually manage to be so present in spite of their (concrete) absence? My answer 
is that they succeed in doing so, by instilling a very powerful and yet equally neglected feeling: 
hope. I will try to further elaborate on this.  
In 1997, Sarah Franklin forged the expression “hope technology”, with reference to In Vitro 
Fertilization (IVT); what she meant was that, in the case of IVT, it was the hope that it instilled in 
the patients, more than its concrete (positive or negative) outcome, that made IVT always appear 
a desirable option (1997, p. 203). In my project, I argue that, in the case of energy technologies 
such as pipelines, although these have often been criticized as the least desirable option in 
comparison for example to greener energy sources, nevertheless, they have contributed to the 
generation of hope and, by doing so, they have structured people’s lives in anticipation of the 
future. ‘Hope’ then is here to be interpreted as a very pro-active feeling, endowed with the ability 
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to produce expectations and make a certain future appear in the present as tangible, possible to 
achieve (Lynch, 1965).  
In the same way, I would argue that, when a scenario is built and particularly when it is 
communicated to a larger audience, in that moment it acquires a very peculiar promissory 
quality; a scenario does not promise that something will surely happen (given the probabilistic 
nature of this method) but, rather, that something will inevitably change in the future and we 
need to be prepared for that. It thus generates hope, which as we know can assume both a 
positive or negative connotation: one can hope that something materializes and then do 
everything possible to fulfil that goal or, conversely, hope that it never does and therefore make 
all possible efforts in order to prevent an undesired future from becoming reality. It is in this 
sense that, in my project, I describe pipelines as hope technologies, not because they actually 
embody the most desirable energy solution but because they have managed to persuade those 
relationally connected by them that transformation is possible and that the future cannot be 
passively accepted as inevitable.  
The first result of this persuasion is an incredibly proactive attitude which, once it has been 
recommended and eventually embraced by the majority, is also extremely hard to give up. The 
power of persuasion, which I assume to be embedded in specific technologies, is a deeply 
ambiguous one and, as I intend to suggest, exercised also within scenario-building. Scenarios in 
fact need to be persuasive enough if they aim to be seriously taken into account and to stimulate 
a concrete response from those who listen to them. Thus, the more hope they succeed in 
instilling in their recipients, the more persuasion and, consequently, control they can expect to 
achieve.  
What I want to hint at here is that hope, while being as equally powerful as powerfully 
manipulated, can be regarded as what Foucault called the “technology of power” (1988). In this 
sense, hope is instilled with the precise goal of directing people’s behaviour and thus producing 
certain desired effects (Rose, 1999). Technologies of power, according to Foucault, in fact, 
“…determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, an 
objectivizing of the subject” (Foucault 1988, p. 18). One can thus say that future scenarios—
including those which might foresee the achievement of increasing oil and gas development, 
thanks to the building of new pipelines—exercise power through methods of developing, 
encouraging and sustaining hope. However, as previously stressed, far from being a passive 
feeling, hope, once generated, is also used to activate concrete anticipatory mechanisms, which 
allow the future scenarios to vividly—and strategically—materialize in the present.  
 
Anticipating the future, in the present  
This kind of inherently active temporal disposition that hope triggers is a rather interesting one 
and will be identified as anticipation (Bloch, 1986). Sara Ahmed, the main representative of the 
so-called emotional turn, characterizes anticipation as “affective as an orientation towards the 
future, as that which is ahead of us, as that which is to come” (2010, p. 181). This orientation, 
however, is not some form of ideal projection towards a future, which we hope will (or will not) 
materialize, but requires us instead to self-consciously direct our behaviour in the present. 
Anthropology Professor, Gisa Weszkalnys, who has conducted studies on oil futurities, 
emphasizes that “to anticipate is not to simply expect it; it is to realize that something is about 
to happen and, importantly, to act on that premonition” (2014, p. 212). 
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According to Weszkalnys, anticipation is therefore a deeply affective state, in the sense that it 
prompts people to not passively wait until the “not yet” becomes present but to proactively 
engage themselves in what she calls “a temporal politics of a disaster yet to come”. Although in 
Weszkalnys’s analysis, the temporal politics is explicitly directed to prevent the economic disaster 
associated with oil exploration in African states, I believe that it could be useful to also apply this 
particular temporal disposition to other contexts and especially those where resource extraction 
plays an important role. Hence, by drawing on this theoretical perspective, I suggest in my project 
that the Arctic, as a resource-rich region, has been the setting of a temporal politics based on the 
anticipation of a future yet to come (Sejersen, 2015): a future where pipelines are there, 
anchored to the ground, in all their tangible materiality. In this sense, I state that, by only 
potentially being there, pipelines have nevertheless succeeded in activating the mechanism of 
anticipation (Nuttall, 2007): this has encouraged people to come together, to take a position 
either in favour of or against their building and consequently to become pipeline stakeholders. 
There is then an inner aspect of productivity in this temporal process, which becomes evident if 
we think about how anticipation works. In this sense, during the HND 2016, Researcher Elana 
Wilson Rowe from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs delivered a very insightful 
presentation on “Thinking About the Future”. Her talk, which presented examples from un-built 
(so-called ‘ghost’) energy projects, was centred on how predicting the future often ends up 
radically affecting the present we live in. In an article published a few weeks before the 
conference, Rowe wrote that “Expectations or ideas about the future then morph into concrete 
actions that make the predicted future more likely to come about” (2016). Hence, anticipating 
not only means talking about the future (as expected during events like the High North Dialogue) 
but also growing a deeper consciousness about it, thus prompting concrete action in the present. 
Anticipating entails being ready for whatever the future may bring and being ready now. In this 
sense then, I argue that preparedness is a complex, hectic and escalating process,  resulting in a 
huge amount of documents, programmes and reports which surround different events—whether 
it is the construction of pipelines or the fulfilment of a future scenario—and contribute to making 
people (feel) ready.   
In my project, in order to better illustrate this process, I have decided to focus my attention on 
the Mackenzie Gas Project negotiations in Northern Canada, during which a massive series of 
policy documents, environmental and social impact assessments, newspaper articles and books 
have been released as part of a specific anticipatory strategy. Then, quoting anthropologist 
Rebecca Bryant, one can argue that the temporal politics which is set in motion by the (potential) 
pipeline—as much as the (potential) scenario—is one that “brings the present into 
consciousness, creating an awareness or perception of present-ness that we do not normally 
have” (2016, p. 1). Bryant calls this sense of present-ness the “uncanny present” and refers to it 
as a state in which the present becomes “anxiously visceral to us as a moment caught between 
past and future” (p. 2). Quite interestingly, I notice that this “uncanny present” is one where the 
past, and not merely the future, also plays an important role. If we look at the indigenous 
testimonies made during the Berger Inquiry in Northern Canada, the past is continuously used as 
a strategic tool in order to emphasize how present choices will inevitably also have an impact on 
the continuity established in the past. So in this sense, a pipeline is often regarded as a new 
instrument of oppression that reiterates the old colonial relationships or threatens the traditional 
livelihoods and the land that indigenous peoples assert to have maintained for thousands of 
years. Again, as Bryant brilliantly points out, “We acquire a sense that what we do in this present 
will be decisive for both the past and the future, giving to the present the status of a threshold” 
(p. 2). Present hope and consequent present anticipation then manage to both keep the past 
alive and, at the same time, to promote specific visions of the future that will be.  
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Conclusion 
I find it most fascinating and relevant to look at how, especially within resource-rich regions such 
as the Arctic, anticipation is set in motion and how hope appears to be inextricably linked with 
political activism (Ahmed, 2004; Roseneil, 1995; Roseneil and Seymour, 1999).  
I have here used my experience at the High North Dialogue 2016 to investigate the nature of 
anticipatory strategies such as scenario-building and to combine it with my current work on 
pipelines’ construction in Northern Canada. As I have tried to suggest, there are some 
technologies—whether these are energy infrastructures such as pipelines or foresight techniques 
like scenarios—which, through their inherently potential character, can be used to exercise 
control.  
In this sense, I have argued here that scenario-building can also be addressed as a government 
technique, since, although portraying a future which is only potentially there, it nevertheless 
contributes to shaping conduct, by levering the aspirations and the desires of the actors who are 
the intended recipients of this anticipatory practice. Because of the opportunity to directly 
participate in the building and the communication of a scenario, I found the High North 
Dialogue—as one of the biggest gatherings specifically focused on Arctic governance and 
involving a very diverse set of Arctic stakeholders—a particularly revealing context. Here, the 
Arctic, constantly materializing in every presentation and debate, proved to be also the perfect 
setting, where hopes and visions of the future are now being strategically employed to influence 
choices in the present. 
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ARCTIC GOVERNANCE: THE ROLE OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL 
Zhaklin V. Yaneva 
 
Introduction 
Considering the Arctic’s great potential in natural resources, for most of the 20th century it has 
been seen as “a space for robust expressions of sovereignty so that the national security of the 
state might be secured” (Heininen, 2014, p. 244). During the Cold War, this remote region turned 
into an exceptionally militarized zone due to its geostrategic importance as a meeting point 
between two great powers. Nevertheless, the Arctic has always been part of the world’s affairs, 
both politically and economically, and this importance is currently being reinforced: the region is 
rapidly changing as a consequence of the global process of climate change and “a suite of factors 
that we commonly group together under the rubric of globalization” (Young, 2010, p. 164).14 
According to Skagestad (2010), these new circumstances served as a catalyst for the gradual 
opening of the High North15 to more intensive human activities, as the sea-ice is receding and 
creating a wide range of opportunities. These include increased commercial shipping through the 
maritime routes along the Russian and Canadian coasts—Northern Sea Route and Northwest 
Passage—and via the North Pole; further oil and gas extraction and exploitation; the possibility 
to extend continental platforms; new commercial fisheries; and ship-based tourism. It is certain 
that “These prospects are creating high expectations about the economic potential of the Arctic 
but also concern about this generating conflict between the Arctic countries” (Advisory Council 
on International Affairs, 2015, p. 54). In addition, it is difficult to be sure whether the potential 
could compensate for or even balance the associated risk for the fragile environment and 
traditional indigenous lifestyle, as the new prospects are, “in large measure, surface 
manifestation or symptoms of change rather than underlying drivers of change” (Young, 2010, 
pp. 167-8).  
The role of the Arctic Council in the governance of the region is described generally by the present 
paper, which is part of a wider study that analyses a specific aspect of the council’s activity: 
namely, its role as mediator between the different interests in order to maintain peaceful 
relations in the area and, ultimately, prevent greater conflicts.  
 
The role of the Arctic Council in the governance of the region 
With regard to the ongoing metamorphosis, the Arctic region has become an area with a complex 
legal and institutional structure, where the Arctic Council (hereinafter, the council or the AC)—
the most prominent circumpolar institution and main political forum fostering cooperation 
                                                     
1 Briefly, the globalization is characterized by power transition, rise of emerging markets and increased 
interconnection between actors on the international scene. 
2 Skagestad (2010) observes that the term “High North” was introduced as English equivalent of the Norwegian 
nordområdene (the northern areas) in the mid-1980s, eventually becoming adopted by the Norwegian authorities at 
the beginning of the 21st century. This term is mainly used by the Nordic countries to refer to their territory north of 
the Polar Circle, while the other Arctic states tend to refer to their “Arctic” regions, meaning the region north of the 
forest line or the 10oC isotherm for July. 
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among governments, indigenous peoples16 and the scientific community—brings together not 
only the Arctic states but also a growing number of observers on relevant Arctic topics. 
Nowadays, the council has become the primary intergovernmental forum in the region, as it was 
created to address the abovementioned challenges to the Arctic’s future in recognition of the 
fact that policy-makers need scientific collaboration in envisioning appropriate solutions, while 
constantly adjusting to the changing environment.  
An analysis of the council’s role in the region supposes that some attention is paid to governance 
issues: the functioning of the AC is usually analysed through the lenses of international regimes 
and state-to-state relationships, often leaving aside analysis of the sub-state unit (Spence, 2014; 
Stoker, 1998).17 Since its introduction into political science, the concept of governance has 
enjoyed an impressive acceptance by academia as it “involves a shift in the analytical and 
theoretical focus from ‘institutions’ to ‘processes’ of rule and announces the eclipse or erosion 
of state sovereignty,” stressing that “There are important mechanisms of social regulation 
besides the state” (Lemke, 2007, p. 53; see also Hufty, 2011) that “do not rest on recourse to the 
authority and sanctions of government” (Stoker, 1998, p. 17).  
Therefore, the governance theory searches for mechanisms that foster coordination, 
cooperation and harmonization, addressing all interested parties in promoting the consultation 
and/or implication of the whole variety of societal and economic actors (referred to as partners 
or stakeholders), while stressing the need for political consensus and collective problem solving. 
In this conceptual frame, conflicts are not regarded as a threat but rather as a means of social 
progress. Thus, according to Haftendorn (2013, p. 13), “In cases where both state and hierarchy 
are lacking, coordination has to be based on voluntary commitments and compliance” in the form 
of negotiation, accepting compromises, granting mutual concessions or simply bargaining. 
Accordingly, the Arctic Council should be understood as an alternative governance model that is 
successful in its own right. 
 
Creation of the Arctic Council 
The time at which the council was established was not just a fortuity. Rather, it resulted from the 
complex transition within the system of international relations after the end of the Cold War and 
the disappearance of the bipolarity, when the world was strictly divided between the United 
States and the USSR. Gorbachev’s famous speech in Murmansk is often regarded as the starting 
point of the Arctic’s metamorphosis. In this iconic discourse, the Soviet leader referred to the 
region as a “zone of peace” and called for improved cooperation, which eventually supposed “the 
opening of the Arctic to a variety of initiatives framed in circumpolar rather than global 
terms” (Young, 2010, p. 168).  
The small Arctic states responded quickly and took the lead, launching a series of important 
initiatives aimed at promoting cooperation and collaboration between the regional stakeholders. 
                                                     
16 The founders of the AC provided unprecedented active participation of the Arctic indigenous communities, whose 
representatives became permanent participants who should be consulted before the adoption of any relevant decision. 
The indigenous representatives include: the Aleut International Association, the Arctic Athabascan Council, the 
Gwich’in Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the 
North and the Saami Council. 
17 Stoker defines them as follows: “International regimes are systems of norms and roles agreed upon by states to 
govern their behavior in specific political context or issue areas … a response to the challenge of governing without 
government.”  
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In this regard, Finland started the Rovaniemi Process, which culminated in 1989 with the 
adoption of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS),18 from which, on a Canadian 
initiative, the Arctic Council evolved, after the adoption of the Ottawa Declaration in 1996. 
Meanwhile, Norway laid the foundations for cooperation in the Barents region.  
Therefore, by the beginning of the 21st century, the wide network of cooperative activities in the 
region had turned the High North into a distinct area with a policy agenda of its own, in which 
the Arctic Council had acquired the status of the prime “linchpin of the Arctic 
governance” (Haftendorn, 2013, p. 15), as it was created to pursue partnerships between Arctic 
states and indigenous peoples as well as the harmonization of national agendas. Functioning in 
all spheres, the only exception was defence matters and military security, explicitly prohibited 
within the constitutive resolution.  
On the other hand, over recent decades, the High North has started to attract increasing 
international attention, not only from the countries that surround it but also from a number of 
other state and non-state actors interested in influencing the decision-making process on the 
future of “the last frontier on Earth” (Stavridis, 2013). The region, thus, emerged from being a 
marginal periphery during the Cold War, when the two superpowers were confronting each other 
in a demonstration of muscle without serious conflicts, into a “centre of geopolitics, as melting 
Arctic ice transforms the region from one of primarily scientific interest into a maelstrom of 
competing commercial, national security and environmental concerns, with profound 
implications for the international legal and political system” (Ebinger and Zambetakis, 2009, p. 
1215).  
 
Functioning of the Arctic Council 
As Nord (2106, p. 58) states, the Arctic Council is the “product of a number of necessary 
compromises between those countries and groups that have combined to bring it into operation” 
and, thus, its member states, permanent participants and observers act together to represent 
the whole variety of perspectives and priorities within the circumpolar region. In its activity, the 
council is assisted to provide anticipatory evidence for the ongoing changes by the following 
working groups: 
• Arctic Contaminants Action Plan (ACAP): provides information and encourages states to 
take preventive actions relating to contaminants and other pollutants. 
• Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP): provides information on the 
status of, and threats to, the Arctic environment. 
• Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF): addresses the conservation of biodiversity 
and sustainability of Arctic living resources in cooperation with governments and residents. 
• Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR): deals with the prevention of, 
preparedness for and response to environmental emergencies in the Arctic. 
• Protection of Arctic Marine Environment (PAME): addresses pollution prevention and 
control measures related to the protection of the Arctic marine environment through 
coordinated action programmes and guidelines complementing existing frameworks. 
                                                     
18 The AEPS focused on fostering international cooperation in scientific research, data sharing, and environmental 
impact assessment. The initiative was unique as it reunited the former adversaries, while including representatives 
from the Arctic indigenous people. 
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• Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG): pursues initiatives that provide 
practical knowledge and contributes to building the capacity of indigenous peoples and Arctic 
communities to respond to the challenges and benefit from the emerging opportunities.  
In addition, there are several temporary task forces operating in the following areas: Institutional 
Issues; Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response; Short-Lived Climate Forcers 
(black carbon, methane, and tropospheric ozone); and Search and Rescue. In this regard, an 
important milestone in the Arctic Council’s activity was the conclusion of the first internationally 
binding agreement under its auspices: the 2012 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and 
Maritime Search and Rescue,19 followed by the 2013 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil 
Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, the council’s second ever binding agreement. 
Accordingly, the AC has been gradually expanding its own institutions over the years and since 
2013 has a permanent secretariat at Tromsø, financed by members’ contributions. Despite these 
advances, its organizational structure remains rather weak as it cannot advance in areas which 
its members are not willing or ready to include.  
Nevertheless, the council has surpassed the expectations with which it was created, as it has not 
only served as a forum which brings together former adversaries in a cooperative environment 
but has also been able to attract the attention of other important actors. As for how the 
participation of these new actors affects the AC’s functionality, it is obvious that diversifying the 
stakeholders in the Arctic governance will eventually suppose a more complicated process of 
decision-making as there will be many and different interests that need to be reconciled.20 
Compromises will be needed as the traditional Arctic states will not be able to forever keep other 
powers out of what they believe is a zone of their influence and, thus, they will not remain for 
much longer the sole and primary stakeholders in the region.  
As Haftendorn (2013, p. 18) states, “For some years in the 2000s, however, the Arctic Council 
found itself being marginalized in high-political and procedural terms,” as the five Arctic coastal 
states – Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States – reasserted their control over 
the region with the conclusion of the Ilulissat Declaration in 2008. Nevertheless, the declaration 
is an important achievement for the governance of the region, as the commitment to 
international law—specifically, the Law of the Sea—put an end to the perception of the Arctic as 
a lawless region. Meanwhile, the Ilulissat Declaration also raises questions as to the current and 
future role of the council. 
Until now, within the Arctic governance, the council “has played an important role in developing 
and disseminating the discourse of ecosystem-based management as applied to Arctic affairs” 
(Young, 2010, p. 175), clarifying the major environmental changes occurring in the region. In this 
regard, Young implies that “[b]ecause the Council is not embroiled in the complexities and 
                                                     
19 The main inconvenience of the Agreement, however, is its closed nature, which means that it is binding only for the 
eight Arctic states. However, as pointed out by Haftendorn (2013, p. 23), “They might call on EU, NATO and other 
capabilities in addition to their own Coast Guard units in order to discharge their duties under the S&R Agreement. 
This issue highlights the tension between the sovereign rights of the AC members and the idea of a cooperative, non-
zero-sum multilateral system for which the Arctic Council stands.” 
20 At the beginning, there were no concrete criteria for becoming an observer at the AC. However, at the 2011 Nuuk 
Ministerial Meeting, its members reached consensus that observers must respect the principles that govern the region 
as laid down by the Council, recognize the Arctic States’ sovereignty and sovereign rights, and share the values, 
interests, culture and traditions of the Arctic indigenous peoples and other Arctic inhabitants. Because the AC acts by 
consensus, each of its members can block such applications. Basically, non-Arctic countries should be pure observers 
and not meddle in Arctic affairs, even though their political and financial support to the work of the AC will be 
welcome. 
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inevitable antagonisms of regulatory politics, it is comparatively free to engage in generative 
activities whose influence takes the form of shaping the underlying discourse on Arctic policy 
rather than making decisions about specific issues [which] comes at a price in terms of political 
connections that raises serious questions about the future of the Council” (Young, 2010).  
It is highly probable that the AC’s functionality will be reinforced to increase its influence in 
managing emerging issues. There is an ongoing debate about strengthening its institutions to 
make them more effective, but it is doubtful whether it will eventually fully transform into a 
comprehensive treaty-based international organization. There are also analysts who are sceptical 
that there is enough political will to empower the AC with the necessary treaty-making and 
enforcement authority required to make such a transition, as the region is currently covered by 
other legal frameworks which possess the authority the council lacks (Koivurova, 2010). 
Nevertheless, the more informal character of this institution is what enhances trust, as states 
feel free to act in a more flexible way: a fact that eventually anticipates their readiness to 
cooperate on a great variety of topics. That is why the best option might be to adapt the existing 
and well-established institutions and legal frameworks to the specific conditions of the Arctic and 
its demands, rather than creating a new one that might lack credibility and legitimacy. 
 
Conclusion 
In the short term, the changing climate conditions will not lead to further large-scale oil and gas 
extraction or busy shipping traffic, as improved infrastructure and deeper knowledge are needed. 
For that reason, existing minor discrepancies seem unlikely to escalate into military or other 
serious conflict in the foreseeable future, because of the presence of mutual interests and 
interdependence among the Arctic states. Therefore, despite some economic appetites, the 
future of the High North’s development will likely continue to be based on cooperation, 
commitment to international law (the one in force and possible future adjustments) and joint 
regional management and governance.  
Undoubtedly, in the words of Axworthy and Hurley (2010), in future years “The solutions to the 
complex challenges of the ‘New Arctic’ will lie in the intricate games—strategic dances—among 
states, companies, indigenous peoples, NGOs, international organizations and other dynamic 
interests”,21 which makes their commitment to mutual understanding and assistance as well as 
their ability to cooperate, build consensus and reduce competitiveness a vital factor for the 
future of the High North. Research and science, together with the promotion of low tension, 
stability and respect for international regulations will be essential for the development of 
sustainable solutions for the Arctic.  
Thus, a great variety of factors—the pace and predictability of environmental changes; demand 
for and pricing of natural resources; extraction, processing, and transportation costs to markets; 
decisions or indecision of the Arctic leaders—will eventually determine the future strengthening 
or weakening of the Arctic Council and its role in the governance of the High North.  
 
 
                                                     
21 Axworthy and Hurley (2016) advocate for the implementation of the so called “network governance” that will 
enable all stakeholders to be part of the decision-making process on a variety of shared global problems, e.g. climate 
change-induced transformation of the Arctic.  
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